The epitome of Fraud Waste and AbuseSummary: The Wall Street Journal reported that Richard Scott, "the former chief executive of HCA Inc," had formed the non-profit organization Conservatives for Patients' Rights as part of a "lobbying campaign to derail or modify" President Obama's health care proposals, but failed to note that Scott resigned from HCA in 1997 amid a federal investigation into the company's Medicare billing, physician recruiting, and home-care practices. HCA eventually pleaded guilty to fraud charges and paid approximately $1.7 billion in fines and penalties.
Who is Richard Scott? Who is Richard Rainwater? Who is Darla Moore?
Before GW Bush was affiliated with Richard Rainwater may I remind you-Richard Scott was the ex-partner of Richard Rainwater with Columbia Homecare Group.
THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 2003; WWW.USDOJ.GOV;
HCA Inc. (formerly known as Columbia/HCA and HCA - The Healthcare Company)
LARGEST HEALTH CARE FRAUD CASE IN U.S. HISTORY SETTLED; HCA INVESTIGATION NETS RECORD TOTAL OF $1.7 BILLION
Note: Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) was acquired by Columbia in 1994.
Why does this matter? Because the wrath of Richard Scott’s fraud just ended in December 2008 in the largest private financial fraud case in our country's history in 2002 when FBI raided the offices of National Century Financial Enterprises Dublin, Ohio, headquarters.
Guess where Columbia and many of the other publicly traded healthcare companies DUMPED their losing asset, Home healthcare? National Century Financial Enterprises
National Century Financial Enterprises:
“This case is one of the largest corporate fraud investigations involving a privately held company headquartered in small town America,” said Assistant Director Kenneth W. Kaiser of the FBI Criminal Investigative Division.
The following is an excerpt from a 10-K SEC Filing, filed by J P MORGAN CHASE & CO on 3/9/2006: Enron litigation. JPMorgan Chase and certain of its officers and directors are involved in a number of lawsuits arising out of its banking relationships with Enron Corp.; the three current or former Firm employees are sued in their roles as former members of NCFE's board of directors
March 26, 2008; By Jodi Andes; THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH
Nine other executives have been convicted or pleaded guilty in National Century's collapse. Only Poulsen and executive James Happ still await trial.
Only Poulsen and executive James Happ still await trial?
December 9, 2008. James K. Happ, 48, is charged with conspiracy, money-laundering conspiracy and three counts of wire fraud; the 11th National Century executive to be tried or admit guilt. , Also today, a former friend of Happ's testified that, while working at National Century, Happ boasted that he never could be charged with any fraud because he didn't sign anything.
December 18, 2008 - The ONE AND ONLY acquittal; James K Happ!
By Jodi Andes THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH
Prosecutors' case fell short, juror says National Century fraud case produces 1st acquittal ; The "not guilty" verdicts that came in federal court yesterday were not so much a vindication of the last National Century Financial Enterprises executive to stand trial, a juror said.
Instead, they were more a belief that federal prosecutors had not done their job, the juror said after he and his fellow jurors acquitted James K. Happ of five counts after 12 hours of deliberation. "He very well may have been guilty. A lot of us thought he was," said the juror who wouldn't give his name. "But if he was, you gotta have the evidence."
July 26, 1997- Where was James K Happ?
SEC Form September 9, 2003 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, Med Diversified Inc.:
Previously, Mr. Happ served for three years as executive vice president of NCFE, during which time he restructured the servicer department to improve operational performance and accelerated the utilization of technology to increase operational efficiency.
Mr. Happ also served as chief financial officer of the Dallas-based Columbia Homecare Group, Inc.,
… In this role, he directed the company through the challenging reimbursement climate, known as the interim payment system, and participated in the divestiture of all of Columbia/HCA's home care operations
Columbia-Richard Rainwater-GW Bush-and the PROSECUTOR did not do his JOB!
Showing posts with label Forbes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Forbes. Show all posts
Thursday, March 5, 2009
Thursday, October 9, 2008
One week into the trial for the CEO Lance Poulsen, yes. However, this case has been ongoing since February. However, there is an ex executive, James J Happ that has yet to go on trial. His is scheduled for December 2008.
Funny, all the other executives and partners/founders have been sentenced except other than the one on 'America's Most Wanted' list.
Who is James K Happ, perhaps the most important criminal of all?
If only reporters would follow the money with this ex-CFO of Columbia Homecare Group, Inc., NCFE and Med Diversified Inc. (Can you follow the money?)
In 1998, a time when no one wanted homecare companies, stated in SEC records, James K Happ assisted with the divestiture of the losing homecare group within HCA/TN Inc.: Columbia Homecare Group Inc. And who is related to that group? Richard Rainwater and Richard Scott. Who is Richard Rainwater? G W Bush's ex-partner)
Who financed this divestiture? NCFE, National Century Financial Enterprises Inc.
Funny, all the other executives and partners/founders have been sentenced except other than the one on 'America's Most Wanted' list.
Who is James K Happ, perhaps the most important criminal of all?
If only reporters would follow the money with this ex-CFO of Columbia Homecare Group, Inc., NCFE and Med Diversified Inc. (Can you follow the money?)
In 1998, a time when no one wanted homecare companies, stated in SEC records, James K Happ assisted with the divestiture of the losing homecare group within HCA/TN Inc.: Columbia Homecare Group Inc. And who is related to that group? Richard Rainwater and Richard Scott. Who is Richard Rainwater? G W Bush's ex-partner)
Who financed this divestiture? NCFE, National Century Financial Enterprises Inc.
Tuesday, October 7, 2008
Who advised Arizona to invest in NCFE? John McCain?
*Ratification of Authorization to Initiate Litigation Seeking to Recover Losses Incurred Through Investments in Bonds Issued by National Century Financial Enterprises and Authorization to Enter into an Intergovernmental Agreement with Other Arizona Governmental Entities to Pursue Recovery of These Losses (ASU and NAU)
The Local Government Investment Pool (LGIP) is a statutorily authorized investment fund, consisting of monies deposited by the State and more than 100 counties, cities, political subdivisions, and other public entities, managed by the State Treasurer.
Between March 2001 and June 2002, the State Treasurer invested a portion of the LGIP funds in NCFE bonds. In October 2002, a nationwide scandal broke out concerning financial mismanagement and possible fraud by NCFE’s principals and in November 2002, NCFE filed for bankruptcy. ASU lost nearly $4M and NAU lost approximately $600,000. The UA did not, at that time, have any funds invested in the LGIP. The Arizona Attorney General’s office filed a bankruptcy claim on behalf of the State Treasurer and all of the Arizona real parties in interest.
Earlier this year several of the individual public entity investors, including ASU, began a series of meetings to examine options available to the investors to recover their losses, including filing a lawsuit against NCFE principals, bond trustees, and other third parties. The group proposed retaining separate counsel for the investors using an intergovern-mental agreement or similar agreement and eventually selected Gibbs & Bruns, a Houston law firm that is already representing investors accounting for about $1.3B in NCFE losses. Cohen Kennedy Dowd & Quigley is local counsel.
On May 16, 2003, the public entity investors were asked to notify the Gibbs and Bruns law firm of their intent to participate in the litigation. The law firm advised of the need for a timely filing in order to avoid potential statute of limitations issues. As authorized by ABOR Policy 1-109 (B), Board Counsel authorized initiation of litigation by ASU and NAU following consultation with Board President Jewett. Under that policy, Board Counsel’s decision to authorize the initiation of litigation is subject to ratification by the Board at its next meeting.
The Board ratified the decision to initiate litigation to pursue the recovery of investment losses incurred by ASU and NAU through an investment of public funds by the Local Government Investment Pool in bonds issued by National Century Financial Enterprises and authorized ASU and NAU to enter into an intergovernmental agreement with other Arizona governmental entities to pursue recovery of these losses, including authority to compromise and/or settle claims and to provide for the distribution of recovered funds.
The Local Government Investment Pool (LGIP) is a statutorily authorized investment fund, consisting of monies deposited by the State and more than 100 counties, cities, political subdivisions, and other public entities, managed by the State Treasurer.
Between March 2001 and June 2002, the State Treasurer invested a portion of the LGIP funds in NCFE bonds. In October 2002, a nationwide scandal broke out concerning financial mismanagement and possible fraud by NCFE’s principals and in November 2002, NCFE filed for bankruptcy. ASU lost nearly $4M and NAU lost approximately $600,000. The UA did not, at that time, have any funds invested in the LGIP. The Arizona Attorney General’s office filed a bankruptcy claim on behalf of the State Treasurer and all of the Arizona real parties in interest.
Earlier this year several of the individual public entity investors, including ASU, began a series of meetings to examine options available to the investors to recover their losses, including filing a lawsuit against NCFE principals, bond trustees, and other third parties. The group proposed retaining separate counsel for the investors using an intergovern-mental agreement or similar agreement and eventually selected Gibbs & Bruns, a Houston law firm that is already representing investors accounting for about $1.3B in NCFE losses. Cohen Kennedy Dowd & Quigley is local counsel.
On May 16, 2003, the public entity investors were asked to notify the Gibbs and Bruns law firm of their intent to participate in the litigation. The law firm advised of the need for a timely filing in order to avoid potential statute of limitations issues. As authorized by ABOR Policy 1-109 (B), Board Counsel authorized initiation of litigation by ASU and NAU following consultation with Board President Jewett. Under that policy, Board Counsel’s decision to authorize the initiation of litigation is subject to ratification by the Board at its next meeting.
The Board ratified the decision to initiate litigation to pursue the recovery of investment losses incurred by ASU and NAU through an investment of public funds by the Local Government Investment Pool in bonds issued by National Century Financial Enterprises and authorized ASU and NAU to enter into an intergovernmental agreement with other Arizona governmental entities to pursue recovery of these losses, including authority to compromise and/or settle claims and to provide for the distribution of recovered funds.
SEC Settles Enforcement Proceedings against J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2003-87
J.P. Morgan Chase Agrees to Pay $135 Million to Settle SEC Allegations that It Helped Enron Commit Fraud
Citigroup Agrees to Pay $120 Million to Settle SEC Allegations that It Helped Enron and Dynegy Commit Fraud
Washington, D.C., July 28, 2003 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission today instituted and settled enforcement proceedings against two major financial institutions, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup, Inc., for their roles in Enron Corp.'s manipulation of its financial statements. Each institution helped Enron mislead its investors by characterizing what were essentially loan proceeds as cash from operating activities. The proceeding against Citigroup also resolves the Commission's charges stemming from the assistance Citigroup provided Dynegy Inc. in manipulating that company's financial statements through similar conduct.
As to J.P. Morgan Chase, the Commission filed a civil injunctive action in U.S. District Court in Texas. Without admitting or denying the Commission's allegations, J.P. Morgan Chase consented to the entry of a final judgment in that action that would (i) permanently enjoin J.P. Morgan Chase from violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, and (ii) order J.P. Morgan Chase to pay $135 million as disgorgement, penalty, and interest.
As to Citigroup, the Commission instituted an administrative proceeding and issued an order making findings and imposing sanctions. Without admitting or denying the Commission's findings, Citigroup consented to the issuance of the Commission's Order whereby Citigroup (i) was ordered to cease and desist from committing or causing any violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, and (ii) agreed to pay $120 million as disgorgement, interest, and penalty. Of that amount, $101 million pertains to Citigroup's Enron-related conduct and $19 million pertains to the Dynegy conduct.
The Commission intends to direct the money paid by J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup to fraud victims ($236 million to Enron fraud victims and $19 million to Dynegy fraud victims) pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
"These two cases serve as yet another reminder that you can't turn a blind eye to the consequences of your actions — if you know or have reason to know that you are helping a company mislead its investors, you are in violation of the federal securities laws," said Stephen M. Cutler, Director of SEC's Enforcement Division. His deputy, Linda Chatman Thomsen, added: "As today's actions illustrate, we intend to continue to hold counter-parties responsible for helping companies manipulate their reported results. Financial institutions in particular should know better than to enter into structured transactions where the structure is determined solely by accounting and reporting wishes of a public company."
J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup engaged in, and indeed helped their clients design, complex structured finance transactions. The structural complexity of these transactions had no business purpose aside from masking the fact that, in substance, they were loans. As alleged in the charging documents, by engaging in certain structural contortions, these financial institutions helped their clients: (1) inflate reported cash flow from operating activities; (2) underreport cash flow from financing activities; and (3) underreport debt. As a result, Enron and Dynegy presented false and misleading pictures of their financial health and results of operations. Significantly, with respect to Enron, both financial institutions knew that Enron engaged in these transactions specifically to allay investor, analyst, and rating agency concerns about its cash flow from operating activities and outstanding debt. Citigroup knew that Dynegy had similar motives for its structured finance transaction.
As alleged by the Commission, these institutions knew that Enron engaged in the structured finance transactions that are the subject of today's Commission actions to match its so-called mark-to-market earnings (paper earnings based on changes in the market value of certain assets held by Enron) with cash flow from operating activities. As alleged, by matching mark-to-market earnings with cash flow from operating activities, Enron sought to convince analysts and credit rating agencies that its reported mark-to-market earnings were real, i.e., that the value of the underlying assets would ultimately be converted into cash.
The Commission further alleges that these institutions also knew that these structured finance transactions yielded another substantial benefit to Enron: they allowed Enron to hide the true extent of its borrowings from investors and rating agencies because sums borrowed in these structured finance transactions did not appear as "debt" on Enron's balance sheet. Instead they appeared as "price risk management liabilities," "minority interest," or otherwise. In addition, Enron's obligation to repay those sums was not otherwise disclosed.
Specifically as to J.P. Morgan Chase, the Commission's allegations stem from J.P. Morgan Chase's participation in so-called prepay transactions with Enron which were loans disguised as commodity trades to achieve Enron's reporting and accounting objectives. These prepays were in substance loans because their structure eliminated all commodity price risk that would normally exist in commodity trades. This was accomplished through a series of trades whereby Enron passed the commodity price risk to a J.P. Morgan Chase-sponsored special purpose vehicle, which passed the risk to J.P. Morgan Chase, which, in turn, passed the risk back to Enron. While each step of this structure appeared to be a commodity trade, with all elements of the structure taken together, Enron received cash upfront and agreed to future repayment of that cash with negotiated interest. The interest amount was set at the time of the contract, was calculated with reference to LIBOR, and was independent of any changes in the price of the underlying commodity. The only risk in the transactions was J.P. Morgan Chase's risk that Enron would not make its payments when due, i.e., credit risk.
The Commission's action with respect to Citigroup also stems from certain prepay transactions with Enron that, while structured somewhat differently than the Chase transactions, had the same overall purpose and effect. Like the J.P. Morgan Chase prepays, the Citigroup prepays passed the commodity price risk from Enron to a Citigroup-sponsored special purpose vehicle to Citigroup and back to Enron. As in the J.P. Morgan Chase prepays, Enron's future obligations under the Citigroup prepays consisted of repayments of principal and interest that were independent of any changes in the price of the underlying commodity.
Additionally, the Commission's action against Citigroup is based on two other transactions with Enron, Project Nahanni and Project Bacchus, each of which was also a structure that transformed cash from financing into cash from operations. As the Commission found, in project Nahanni, Citigroup knowingly helped Enron structure a transaction, that allowed Enron to generate cash from operating activities by selling Treasury bills bought with the proceeds of a loan. Project Bacchus was structured by Enron as a sale of an interest in certain of its pulp and paper businesses to a special purpose entity capitalized by Citigroup with a $194 million loan and $6 million in equity. According to the Commission, however, in substance, Project Bacchus was a $200 million financing from Citigroup, because Citigroup was not at risk for its equity investment in the project.
The Citigroup action also contains findings relating to a transaction with Dynegy — Project Alpha — which was a complex financing that Dynegy used to borrow $300 million. According to the Commission's findings, Citigroup knew that Dynegy implemented Alpha to address the mismatch between its mark-to-market earnings and operating cash flow, and that it characterized as cash from operations what was essentially a loan transaction. As Citigroup knew, Dynegy, too, was concerned that the mismatch between earnings and cash flow from operations would raise questions about the quality of Dynegy's earnings and its ability to sustain those earnings.
In determining to settle its action against Citigroup, the Commission took into account Citigroup's cooperation with the Commission's investigation, as well as its timely efforts to resolve the matter.
The Commission brought its Enron-related actions in coordination with the New York County District Attorney's Office, which, also today, entered into settlement agreements with J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup.
The Commission also acknowledges the assistance of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the New York State Banking Department in connection with today's Enron-related actions. Today, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency entered into separate written agreements with Citigroup. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the New York State Banking Department entered into a written agreement with J.P. Morgan Chase. These agreements, between the institutions and their primary banking regulators, obligate them to enhance their risk management programs and internal controls so as to reduce the risk of similar misconduct.
With these two actions, the Securities and Exchange Commission has raised to six the total number of separate actions it has brought in connection with the Enron matter in the twenty months since Enron declared bankruptcy. The various defendants and respondents include three major financial institutions, Enron's former Chief Financial Officer, and eight other former senior Enron executives. The commission has so far garnered $324 million for the benefit of the victims of the Enron fraud.
The Commission's investigations relating to Enron and Dynegy are continuing.
For further information contact:
Linda Chatman Thomsen, Deputy Director, Division of Enforcement — (202) 942-4501
Harold F. Degenhardt, District Administrator, Fort Worth District Office — (817) 978-6469
Charles J. Clark, Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement — (202) 942-4731
Additional Materials Available at www.sec.gov
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2003-87
J.P. Morgan Chase Agrees to Pay $135 Million to Settle SEC Allegations that It Helped Enron Commit Fraud
Citigroup Agrees to Pay $120 Million to Settle SEC Allegations that It Helped Enron and Dynegy Commit Fraud
Washington, D.C., July 28, 2003 -- The Securities and Exchange Commission today instituted and settled enforcement proceedings against two major financial institutions, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup, Inc., for their roles in Enron Corp.'s manipulation of its financial statements. Each institution helped Enron mislead its investors by characterizing what were essentially loan proceeds as cash from operating activities. The proceeding against Citigroup also resolves the Commission's charges stemming from the assistance Citigroup provided Dynegy Inc. in manipulating that company's financial statements through similar conduct.
As to J.P. Morgan Chase, the Commission filed a civil injunctive action in U.S. District Court in Texas. Without admitting or denying the Commission's allegations, J.P. Morgan Chase consented to the entry of a final judgment in that action that would (i) permanently enjoin J.P. Morgan Chase from violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, and (ii) order J.P. Morgan Chase to pay $135 million as disgorgement, penalty, and interest.
As to Citigroup, the Commission instituted an administrative proceeding and issued an order making findings and imposing sanctions. Without admitting or denying the Commission's findings, Citigroup consented to the issuance of the Commission's Order whereby Citigroup (i) was ordered to cease and desist from committing or causing any violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, and (ii) agreed to pay $120 million as disgorgement, interest, and penalty. Of that amount, $101 million pertains to Citigroup's Enron-related conduct and $19 million pertains to the Dynegy conduct.
The Commission intends to direct the money paid by J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup to fraud victims ($236 million to Enron fraud victims and $19 million to Dynegy fraud victims) pursuant to the Fair Fund provisions of Section 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
"These two cases serve as yet another reminder that you can't turn a blind eye to the consequences of your actions — if you know or have reason to know that you are helping a company mislead its investors, you are in violation of the federal securities laws," said Stephen M. Cutler, Director of SEC's Enforcement Division. His deputy, Linda Chatman Thomsen, added: "As today's actions illustrate, we intend to continue to hold counter-parties responsible for helping companies manipulate their reported results. Financial institutions in particular should know better than to enter into structured transactions where the structure is determined solely by accounting and reporting wishes of a public company."
J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup engaged in, and indeed helped their clients design, complex structured finance transactions. The structural complexity of these transactions had no business purpose aside from masking the fact that, in substance, they were loans. As alleged in the charging documents, by engaging in certain structural contortions, these financial institutions helped their clients: (1) inflate reported cash flow from operating activities; (2) underreport cash flow from financing activities; and (3) underreport debt. As a result, Enron and Dynegy presented false and misleading pictures of their financial health and results of operations. Significantly, with respect to Enron, both financial institutions knew that Enron engaged in these transactions specifically to allay investor, analyst, and rating agency concerns about its cash flow from operating activities and outstanding debt. Citigroup knew that Dynegy had similar motives for its structured finance transaction.
As alleged by the Commission, these institutions knew that Enron engaged in the structured finance transactions that are the subject of today's Commission actions to match its so-called mark-to-market earnings (paper earnings based on changes in the market value of certain assets held by Enron) with cash flow from operating activities. As alleged, by matching mark-to-market earnings with cash flow from operating activities, Enron sought to convince analysts and credit rating agencies that its reported mark-to-market earnings were real, i.e., that the value of the underlying assets would ultimately be converted into cash.
The Commission further alleges that these institutions also knew that these structured finance transactions yielded another substantial benefit to Enron: they allowed Enron to hide the true extent of its borrowings from investors and rating agencies because sums borrowed in these structured finance transactions did not appear as "debt" on Enron's balance sheet. Instead they appeared as "price risk management liabilities," "minority interest," or otherwise. In addition, Enron's obligation to repay those sums was not otherwise disclosed.
Specifically as to J.P. Morgan Chase, the Commission's allegations stem from J.P. Morgan Chase's participation in so-called prepay transactions with Enron which were loans disguised as commodity trades to achieve Enron's reporting and accounting objectives. These prepays were in substance loans because their structure eliminated all commodity price risk that would normally exist in commodity trades. This was accomplished through a series of trades whereby Enron passed the commodity price risk to a J.P. Morgan Chase-sponsored special purpose vehicle, which passed the risk to J.P. Morgan Chase, which, in turn, passed the risk back to Enron. While each step of this structure appeared to be a commodity trade, with all elements of the structure taken together, Enron received cash upfront and agreed to future repayment of that cash with negotiated interest. The interest amount was set at the time of the contract, was calculated with reference to LIBOR, and was independent of any changes in the price of the underlying commodity. The only risk in the transactions was J.P. Morgan Chase's risk that Enron would not make its payments when due, i.e., credit risk.
The Commission's action with respect to Citigroup also stems from certain prepay transactions with Enron that, while structured somewhat differently than the Chase transactions, had the same overall purpose and effect. Like the J.P. Morgan Chase prepays, the Citigroup prepays passed the commodity price risk from Enron to a Citigroup-sponsored special purpose vehicle to Citigroup and back to Enron. As in the J.P. Morgan Chase prepays, Enron's future obligations under the Citigroup prepays consisted of repayments of principal and interest that were independent of any changes in the price of the underlying commodity.
Additionally, the Commission's action against Citigroup is based on two other transactions with Enron, Project Nahanni and Project Bacchus, each of which was also a structure that transformed cash from financing into cash from operations. As the Commission found, in project Nahanni, Citigroup knowingly helped Enron structure a transaction, that allowed Enron to generate cash from operating activities by selling Treasury bills bought with the proceeds of a loan. Project Bacchus was structured by Enron as a sale of an interest in certain of its pulp and paper businesses to a special purpose entity capitalized by Citigroup with a $194 million loan and $6 million in equity. According to the Commission, however, in substance, Project Bacchus was a $200 million financing from Citigroup, because Citigroup was not at risk for its equity investment in the project.
The Citigroup action also contains findings relating to a transaction with Dynegy — Project Alpha — which was a complex financing that Dynegy used to borrow $300 million. According to the Commission's findings, Citigroup knew that Dynegy implemented Alpha to address the mismatch between its mark-to-market earnings and operating cash flow, and that it characterized as cash from operations what was essentially a loan transaction. As Citigroup knew, Dynegy, too, was concerned that the mismatch between earnings and cash flow from operations would raise questions about the quality of Dynegy's earnings and its ability to sustain those earnings.
In determining to settle its action against Citigroup, the Commission took into account Citigroup's cooperation with the Commission's investigation, as well as its timely efforts to resolve the matter.
The Commission brought its Enron-related actions in coordination with the New York County District Attorney's Office, which, also today, entered into settlement agreements with J.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup.
The Commission also acknowledges the assistance of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the New York State Banking Department in connection with today's Enron-related actions. Today, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency entered into separate written agreements with Citigroup. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the New York State Banking Department entered into a written agreement with J.P. Morgan Chase. These agreements, between the institutions and their primary banking regulators, obligate them to enhance their risk management programs and internal controls so as to reduce the risk of similar misconduct.
With these two actions, the Securities and Exchange Commission has raised to six the total number of separate actions it has brought in connection with the Enron matter in the twenty months since Enron declared bankruptcy. The various defendants and respondents include three major financial institutions, Enron's former Chief Financial Officer, and eight other former senior Enron executives. The commission has so far garnered $324 million for the benefit of the victims of the Enron fraud.
The Commission's investigations relating to Enron and Dynegy are continuing.
For further information contact:
Linda Chatman Thomsen, Deputy Director, Division of Enforcement — (202) 942-4501
Harold F. Degenhardt, District Administrator, Fort Worth District Office — (817) 978-6469
Charles J. Clark, Assistant Director, Division of Enforcement — (202) 942-4731
Additional Materials Available at www.sec.gov
Labels:
Financial Institutes FRAUD,
Forbes,
JPMorgan Chase
Moody's "underestimated liquidity pressure
Moody's "underestimated liquidity pressure
Why Wasn't NCFE's Collapse Predicted Sooner?
Seth Lubove, 11.21.02, 12:30 PM ET
The implosion and bankruptcy of National Century Financial Enterprises has unleashed the predictable media constabulary and FBI raid typical of the post-Enron reaction to business failures. "Health care scandal intensifies," wailed USA Today. "Ohio Firm's Woes Ripple Across Health Care Business," intoned The New York Times.
But the real story is why anyone is so surprised at the failure of Dublin, Ohio-based NCFE, which purchased health care receivables and packaged them into asset-backed securities for investors. As we discovered when we broke the story in October about NCFE's curious business dealings, the company's legal entanglements and ownership stakes in its clients were easy to find in SEC filings, lawsuits and other public documents (see "Risky Business"). After that story ran, the fallout has been swift, including a downgrading of ratings on NCFE's outstanding bonds (see "Heal Thyself").
The firm's shaky finances were an open secret in the small community of health care receivables specialists, several of whom were eager to talk--on background, of course--about their fears that NCFE was a train wreck waiting to happen. Yet it wasn't until Moody's Investor Service issued a sweeping downgrade of NCFE's paper on Oct. 25 that the business collapsed, leaving bondholders stuck with $3.4 billion in paper that is likely to be worth far less than they paid for it. New York-based financial services firm Ambac Financial Group (nyse: ABK - news - people ) has already announced a $79.4 million hit from the fiasco, while several of NCFE's clients have filed for bankruptcy protection.
Consider it the price of ignorance. For instance, much has been made of the revelation that NCFE's owners owned stakes in the company's clients, a potential conflict of interest if NCFE was propping up favored companies at the expense of others. Although no one has yet proved there was anything illegal about the less-than-arm's-length relationships, you can't accuse NCFE of trying to cover it up, at least so far as the stakes in public companies were concerned.
The most recent proxy statement from NCFE borrower Med Diversified (otc: MDDV - news - people ), for example, clearly lists the shares owned by NCFE co-founder Lance Poulsen, his wife and various other NCFE executives, as well as NCFE itself. Med Diversified, an Andover, Mass., home health care provider, has since turned around and launched a $1 billion lawsuit against NCFE, along with bond trustees J.P. Morgan Chase (nyse: JPM - news - people ) and Bank One (nyse: ONE - news - people ).
The latest 10-K for Rx Medical Services, another NCFE client, notes that because NCFE executives own stakes in it, Rx categorizes NCFE "as a related party" due to its "stock ownership in and its ability to exercise control over the operations of the Company."
Some help. Rx, a Fort Lauderdale, Fla., hospital management outfit, recently announced that "more likely than not" it will end up filing for Chapter 11 due to NCFE's troubles.
NCFE's legal problems were also easy to find with a simple search on the Internet, where a nasty shareholder lawsuit involving NCFE and Dr. Steven Scott of PhyAmerica Physician Group, a Durham, N.C., medical staffing firm, could be downloaded for $34.95 from LegalCaseDocs.com. In the lawsuit, which was settled last year for $4.7 million paid to the shareholders, NCFE was accused of "skimming substantial amounts of money" from PhyAmerica, among other mischief.
In addition, the U.S. attorney's office for the District of Maryland helpfully posts an announcement from last March of a temporary restraining order slapped against subsidiaries of NCFE that prevents the firm from taking over the receivables of a bankrupt nursing home.
And yet until its Oct. 25 bombshell, Moody's gave NCFE a clean bill of health, even offering up an affirmation of its ratings in August in response to "inquiries from investors who have expressed concern about the performance of the receivables." Perhaps those investors were sweating after an earlier ratings downgrade in July from Fitch Ratings, which noted "marked increases in the level of defaulted and rejected receivables."
By the time Moody's finally laid into NCFE with "concerns about NCFE's financial stability," it was too late for any of the bondholders, much less the NCFE customers that have tumbled into bankruptcy themselves.
"Hindsight is 20/20," says Jay Eisbruck, a Moody's senior vice president who evaluates NCFE's paper. He says the firm had signed off on NCFE's existing ratings during the summer after meeting with the company, and saw "little change" in "the performance data that the company had provided to us all along."
But it turns out that the numbers Moody's was looking at may have been questionable in the first place. "I guess there are investigations going on now to see what really is the true nature of the receivables," says Eisbruck, who acknowledged in an Oct. 30 conference call that Moody's "underestimated liquidity pressure NCFE faced."
Small comfort for investors.
More From Forbes
Heal Thyself 12.09.02
Since last month's Forbes story on National Century Financial Enterprises, Moody's and Fitch have slashed their ratings on its outstanding bonds and its chairman has resigned.
Health Care Financier's Bitter Pill 10.30.02
Ratings are cut on National Century's asset-backed securities following a Forbes story.
Risky Business 10.28.02
As a financier of last resort to the health care industry, National Century Financial Enterprises has made its owners rich, but not without controversy.
Why Wasn't NCFE's Collapse Predicted Sooner?
Seth Lubove, 11.21.02, 12:30 PM ET
The implosion and bankruptcy of National Century Financial Enterprises has unleashed the predictable media constabulary and FBI raid typical of the post-Enron reaction to business failures. "Health care scandal intensifies," wailed USA Today. "Ohio Firm's Woes Ripple Across Health Care Business," intoned The New York Times.
But the real story is why anyone is so surprised at the failure of Dublin, Ohio-based NCFE, which purchased health care receivables and packaged them into asset-backed securities for investors. As we discovered when we broke the story in October about NCFE's curious business dealings, the company's legal entanglements and ownership stakes in its clients were easy to find in SEC filings, lawsuits and other public documents (see "Risky Business"). After that story ran, the fallout has been swift, including a downgrading of ratings on NCFE's outstanding bonds (see "Heal Thyself").
The firm's shaky finances were an open secret in the small community of health care receivables specialists, several of whom were eager to talk--on background, of course--about their fears that NCFE was a train wreck waiting to happen. Yet it wasn't until Moody's Investor Service issued a sweeping downgrade of NCFE's paper on Oct. 25 that the business collapsed, leaving bondholders stuck with $3.4 billion in paper that is likely to be worth far less than they paid for it. New York-based financial services firm Ambac Financial Group (nyse: ABK - news - people ) has already announced a $79.4 million hit from the fiasco, while several of NCFE's clients have filed for bankruptcy protection.
Consider it the price of ignorance. For instance, much has been made of the revelation that NCFE's owners owned stakes in the company's clients, a potential conflict of interest if NCFE was propping up favored companies at the expense of others. Although no one has yet proved there was anything illegal about the less-than-arm's-length relationships, you can't accuse NCFE of trying to cover it up, at least so far as the stakes in public companies were concerned.
The most recent proxy statement from NCFE borrower Med Diversified (otc: MDDV - news - people ), for example, clearly lists the shares owned by NCFE co-founder Lance Poulsen, his wife and various other NCFE executives, as well as NCFE itself. Med Diversified, an Andover, Mass., home health care provider, has since turned around and launched a $1 billion lawsuit against NCFE, along with bond trustees J.P. Morgan Chase (nyse: JPM - news - people ) and Bank One (nyse: ONE - news - people ).
The latest 10-K for Rx Medical Services, another NCFE client, notes that because NCFE executives own stakes in it, Rx categorizes NCFE "as a related party" due to its "stock ownership in and its ability to exercise control over the operations of the Company."
Some help. Rx, a Fort Lauderdale, Fla., hospital management outfit, recently announced that "more likely than not" it will end up filing for Chapter 11 due to NCFE's troubles.
NCFE's legal problems were also easy to find with a simple search on the Internet, where a nasty shareholder lawsuit involving NCFE and Dr. Steven Scott of PhyAmerica Physician Group, a Durham, N.C., medical staffing firm, could be downloaded for $34.95 from LegalCaseDocs.com. In the lawsuit, which was settled last year for $4.7 million paid to the shareholders, NCFE was accused of "skimming substantial amounts of money" from PhyAmerica, among other mischief.
In addition, the U.S. attorney's office for the District of Maryland helpfully posts an announcement from last March of a temporary restraining order slapped against subsidiaries of NCFE that prevents the firm from taking over the receivables of a bankrupt nursing home.
And yet until its Oct. 25 bombshell, Moody's gave NCFE a clean bill of health, even offering up an affirmation of its ratings in August in response to "inquiries from investors who have expressed concern about the performance of the receivables." Perhaps those investors were sweating after an earlier ratings downgrade in July from Fitch Ratings, which noted "marked increases in the level of defaulted and rejected receivables."
By the time Moody's finally laid into NCFE with "concerns about NCFE's financial stability," it was too late for any of the bondholders, much less the NCFE customers that have tumbled into bankruptcy themselves.
"Hindsight is 20/20," says Jay Eisbruck, a Moody's senior vice president who evaluates NCFE's paper. He says the firm had signed off on NCFE's existing ratings during the summer after meeting with the company, and saw "little change" in "the performance data that the company had provided to us all along."
But it turns out that the numbers Moody's was looking at may have been questionable in the first place. "I guess there are investigations going on now to see what really is the true nature of the receivables," says Eisbruck, who acknowledged in an Oct. 30 conference call that Moody's "underestimated liquidity pressure NCFE faced."
Small comfort for investors.
More From Forbes
Heal Thyself 12.09.02
Since last month's Forbes story on National Century Financial Enterprises, Moody's and Fitch have slashed their ratings on its outstanding bonds and its chairman has resigned.
Health Care Financier's Bitter Pill 10.30.02
Ratings are cut on National Century's asset-backed securities following a Forbes story.
Risky Business 10.28.02
As a financier of last resort to the health care industry, National Century Financial Enterprises has made its owners rich, but not without controversy.
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