First off get it straight-FBI RAIDED the offices on Dublin Ohio in 2002-then it filed for bankruptcy, after the fraud was beginning to uncover, but the trial left out the root-the one acquittal, the ex-CFO of Columbia Homecare Group, James K Happ.
Nearly seven years after National Century Financial Enterprises collapsed in a $2.9 billion fraud, its founder, Lance K. Poulsen, was sentenced to 30 years in prison on Friday in one of the harshest white-collar punishments in history, The New York Times’s Zachery Kouwe reported.
Mr. Poulsen was convicted in October of leading a vast fraud as chief executive of National Century, a company based in Dublin, Ohio, that provided financing for hundreds of clinics, hospitals and other health care providers.
The company’s fall in 2002 contributed to the bankruptcies of 275 health care facilities and cost Credit Suisse and the Pacific Investment Management Company, the nation’s biggest bond fund investor, more than $540 million.
“Mr. Poulsen is an architect of a fraud of such magnitude that it would make sophisticated financial analysts shudder,” Judge Algenon Marbley said in Federal District Court in Ohio. “It is considered the largest fraud at a private company in the United States. Mr. Poulsen perpetrated this fraud over a seven-year period and went to enormous lengths to conceal it.”
Mr. Poulsen, 65, is already serving a 10-year sentence for trying to bribe the main witness against him in the case. His sentence will run concurrently with the sentence for witness tampering.
Mr. Marbley’s decision signals that federal judges could begin imposing harsher sentences for white-collar crime in response to the rise in public outrage over corporate fraud after the discovery of Bernard L. Madoff’s multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme. The sentence for Mr. Poulsen exceeds the 25 years given to Bernard J. Ebbers, the former chief executive of WorldCom, and the 24 years given to Jeffrey K. Skilling, the former Enron chief.
Mr. Marbley also handed out a 25-year sentence to Rebecca Parrett, a former National Century executive who became a fugitive after she was convicted last year.
Mr. Poulsen and Ms. Parrett were also ordered to pay $2.38 billion in restitution.
Before it filed for bankruptcy in 2002, National Century provided loans to a variety of health care companies that were backed by payments expected to be made by insurance companies and government programs like Medicaid and Medicare. Mr. Poulsen then packaged the loans into bonds and sold them to institutional investors and Wall Street firms.
In many cases, the company deliberately lent more to the facilities, many of which were owned by Mr. Poulsen, than their receivables were worth. The scheme finally came apart in the spring of 2002 when investors began to question the value of the loans, which forced National Century into a liquidity crisis.
Go to Article from The New York Times
Showing posts with label JPMorgan Chase. Show all posts
Showing posts with label JPMorgan Chase. Show all posts
Monday, March 30, 2009
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Bigger than Enron-CNBC
CNBC's editorial staff seemed to have awakened from its eight-year slumber just in time to realize that it was Democrats who wrecked the economy. Indeed, according to CNBC's money guru and his radical "wealth destruction" rhetoric, stocks had been hammered, on perhaps an unprecedented level, since Obama took office.
Except, of course, that they hadn't. At least not compared to the stock drops suffered under President Bush. For instance, in the less than six weeks between September 19, 2008, and October 27, 2008, the Dow lost 3,055 points. And between October 10, 2007, and November 20, 2008, the Dow lost a staggering 6,526 points on Bush's watch. By contrast, between January 21 and March 3, when Cramer lobbed his false claim against Obama, the Dow had lost 1,223 points.
Did an extraordinary amount of wealth get destroyed via the stock markets during Bush's tenure? Absolutely. Yet CNBC's Cramer only appeared on Today to blame Obama by name for comparatively modest Dow declines. (And speaking of wealth destruction, if you followed Cramer's "buy" and "sell" stock tips between May 2008 and December 2008, you would have lost 35 percent on your investment.)
And on and on the attacks came from Cramer. As Media Matters previously noted, Cramer this year repeatedly characterized Obama and congressional Democrats as Russian communists, claiming Obama is "taking cues from Lenin" and using terms such as "Bolshevik," "Marx," "comrades," "Soviet," "Winter Palace," and "Politburo" to describe Democrats.
And it hasn't just been Cramer. CNBC's Maria Bartiromo falsely suggested that Obama has proposed taxing small-business revenue. CNBC news anchor Melissa Francis announced she wouldn't vote for Obama's stimulus package. Host Joe Kernen mocked Obama as having been "hijacked by those -- the crazy -- by [Nancy] Pelosi, by [Harry] Reid" and described Obama's budget as "far left." During the same segment, reporter Carl Quintanilla said of Obama's budget, "There is some social engineering going on." Kernen also falsely claimed that Obama had promised to eliminate earmarks.
CNBC host Erin Burnett announced there were "interesting" and "serious" ideas in an op-ed Rush Limbaugh wrote for The Wall Street Journal about how he'd fix the economy. (His remedy: slash capital gains taxes. No, really.) In the op-ed, Limbaugh suggested that if the government did nothing, this recession would pretty much fix itself. That's the column Burnett heralded as "interesting" and "serious."
And now we've suddenly got a showcase CNBC host reportedly eyeing public office in Connecticut as a Republican while bashing away at the new Democratic administration each night, and even criticizing -- on-air -- the Connecticut pol the host wants to unseat.
And did we mention the idiotic Santelli episode? In terms of newsroom standards, it's like Fox News run amok over at CNBC.
And that, Jeff Zucker, is the real problem.
Except, of course, that they hadn't. At least not compared to the stock drops suffered under President Bush. For instance, in the less than six weeks between September 19, 2008, and October 27, 2008, the Dow lost 3,055 points. And between October 10, 2007, and November 20, 2008, the Dow lost a staggering 6,526 points on Bush's watch. By contrast, between January 21 and March 3, when Cramer lobbed his false claim against Obama, the Dow had lost 1,223 points.
Did an extraordinary amount of wealth get destroyed via the stock markets during Bush's tenure? Absolutely. Yet CNBC's Cramer only appeared on Today to blame Obama by name for comparatively modest Dow declines. (And speaking of wealth destruction, if you followed Cramer's "buy" and "sell" stock tips between May 2008 and December 2008, you would have lost 35 percent on your investment.)
And on and on the attacks came from Cramer. As Media Matters previously noted, Cramer this year repeatedly characterized Obama and congressional Democrats as Russian communists, claiming Obama is "taking cues from Lenin" and using terms such as "Bolshevik," "Marx," "comrades," "Soviet," "Winter Palace," and "Politburo" to describe Democrats.
And it hasn't just been Cramer. CNBC's Maria Bartiromo falsely suggested that Obama has proposed taxing small-business revenue. CNBC news anchor Melissa Francis announced she wouldn't vote for Obama's stimulus package. Host Joe Kernen mocked Obama as having been "hijacked by those -- the crazy -- by [Nancy] Pelosi, by [Harry] Reid" and described Obama's budget as "far left." During the same segment, reporter Carl Quintanilla said of Obama's budget, "There is some social engineering going on." Kernen also falsely claimed that Obama had promised to eliminate earmarks.
CNBC host Erin Burnett announced there were "interesting" and "serious" ideas in an op-ed Rush Limbaugh wrote for The Wall Street Journal about how he'd fix the economy. (His remedy: slash capital gains taxes. No, really.) In the op-ed, Limbaugh suggested that if the government did nothing, this recession would pretty much fix itself. That's the column Burnett heralded as "interesting" and "serious."
And now we've suddenly got a showcase CNBC host reportedly eyeing public office in Connecticut as a Republican while bashing away at the new Democratic administration each night, and even criticizing -- on-air -- the Connecticut pol the host wants to unseat.
And did we mention the idiotic Santelli episode? In terms of newsroom standards, it's like Fox News run amok over at CNBC.
And that, Jeff Zucker, is the real problem.
Comprehensive regulatory reform is critical to these efforts
March 26, 2009 10:00 AM EDT
Below is Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner's Written Testimony to the House Financial Services Committee Hearing on financial regulatory reform:
Thank you Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and other members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify about the critical topic of financial regulatory reform.
Over the past 18 months, we have faced the most severe global financial crisis in generations. Some of the world’s largest financial institutions have failed. Equity and real estate prices have fallen sharply, eroding the value of our savings. The supply of credit has tightened dramatically. Confidence in the overall financial system, in the protections it is supposed to afford for investors and consumers, has eroded. These financial pressures have intensified the recession now underway around the world.
And as in any financial crisis, the damage falls on Main Street. It affects the vulnerable. It affects those who were conservative and responsible, not just those who took too much risk.
Our system is wrapped today in extraordinary complexity, but beneath all that, financial systems serve an essential and basic function. Financial institutions and markets transform the earnings and savings of American workers into the loans that finance a home, a new car or a college education. They exist to allocate savings and investment to their most productive uses.
Our financial system does this better than any other financial system in the world, but our system failed in basic fundamental ways. The system proved too unstable and fragile, subject to significant crises every few years, periodic booms in real estate markets and in credit, followed by busts and contraction. Innovation and complexity overwhelmed the checks and balances in the system. Compensation practices rewarded short-term profits over long-term return. We saw huge gains in increased access to credit for large parts of the American economy, but those gains were overshadowed by pervasive failures in consumer protection, leaving many Americans with obligations they did not understand and could not sustain. The huge apparent returns to financial activity attracted fraud on a dramatic scale. Large amounts of leverage and risk were created both within and outside the regulated part of the financial system.
These failures have caused a great loss of confidence in the basic fabric of our financial system, a system that over time has been a tremendous asset for the American economy.
To address this will require comprehensive reform. Not modest repairs at the margin, but new rules of the game. The new rules must be simpler and more effectively enforced and produce a more stable system, that protects consumers and investors, that rewards innovation and that is able to adapt and evolve with changes in the financial market.
On February 25, after meeting with the banking and financial services leadership from Congress, President Obama directed his economic team to develop recommendations for financial regulatory reform and to begin the process of working with the Congress on new legislation. The Treasury Department has been working with the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) to develop a comprehensive plan of reform. This effort has been and will be guided by principles the President set forth earlier this year and in his speech as a candidate at Cooper Union in March 2008.
Financial institutions and markets that are critical to the functioning of the financial system and that could pose serious risks to the stability of the financial system need to be subject to strong oversight by the government. Our financial system and the major centralized markets must be strong and resilient enough to withstand very severe shocks and the failure of one or more large institutions. We need much stronger standards for openness, transparency, and plain, common sense language throughout the financial system. And we need strong and uniform supervision for all financial products marketed to consumers and investors, and tough enforcement of the rules to ensure full accountability for those who violate the public trust.
Financial products and institutions should be regulated for the economic function they provide and the risks they present, not the legal form they take. We can’t allow institutions to cherry pick among competing regulators, and shift risk to where it faces the lowest standards and constraints.
And we need to recognize that risk does not respect national borders. We need to prevent national competition to reduce standards and encourage a race to higher standards. Markets are global and high standards at home need to be complemented by strong international standards enforced more evenly and fairly. These are global markets and challenges. Building on these principles, we want to work with Congress to put in place fundamental reforms that create a stronger, more stable system, with much stronger protections for consumers and investors, and a more streamlined, consolidated, and simple oversight framework.
I want to begin that process today by focusing on proposals that are essential to creating a more stable system, with stronger tools to prevent and manage future crises. In this context, my objective is to concentrate on the substance of the reform agenda, rather than the complex and sensitive questions of who should be responsible for what.
Over the next few weeks we will outline proposals in the areas of consumer and investor protection and for reform of regulatory oversight arrangements.
We start with systemic risk, not just because of its obvious importance to our future economic performance, but also because these issues require more cooperation globally, and they will be at the center of the agenda at the upcoming Leaders’ Summit of the G-20 in London on April 2.
These proposals reflect a range of complex and consequential policy choices. They will require careful work and drafting. It is important that we get this right. We recognize there will be many alternative models put forth to achieve the objective we all share of creating a more stable system. And we look forward to working with the Federal Reserve, with the agencies that make up the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, and with the Congress on a package of reforms that we can all support.
The Crisis and Its Fundamental Causes
The current crisis had many causes.
Two decades of sustained economic growth bred widespread complacency among financial intermediaries and investors, lowering borrowing costs and weakening lending standards.
A global boom in savings resulted in large flows of capital into the United States and other markets, pushing down long-term interest rates and pushing up asset prices. The rising market hid Ponzi schemes and other flagrant abuses that should have been detected and eliminated.
In that environment, institutions and investors looked for higher returns by taking on greater exposure to the risk of infrequent but severe losses.
A long period of home price appreciation encouraged borrowers, lenders, and investors to make choices that could only succeed if home prices continued to appreciate. We had a system under which firms encouraged people to take unwise risks on complicated products, with ruinous results for them and for our financial system.
Market discipline failed to constrain dangerous levels of risk-taking throughout the financial system. New financial products were created to meet demand from investors, and the complexity outmatched the risk-management capabilities of even the most sophisticated financial institutions. Financial activity migrated outside the banking system, relying on the assumption that liquidity would always be available.
Regulated institutions held too little capital relative to the risks to which they were exposed. And the combined effects of the requirements for capital, reserves and liquidity amplified rather than dampened financial cycles. This worked to intensify the boom and magnify the bust.
Supervision and regulation failed to prevent these problems. There were failures where regulation was extensive and failures where it was absent.
Regulators were aware that a large share of loans made by banks and other lenders were being originated for distribution to investors through securitizations, but they did not identify the risks caused by explosive growth in complex products based on these products.
Investment banks, large insurance companies, finance companies, and the GSEs were subject to only limited oversight on a consolidated basis, despite the fact that many of those companies owned federally insured depository institutions or had other access to explicit or implicit forms of support from the government. Federal law allowed many institutions to choose among regulatory regimes for consolidated supervision and, not surprisingly, they avoided the stronger regulatory authority applicable to bank holding companies. Those companies and others were highly leveraged or used short-term borrowing to buy long-term assets, yet lacked strong federal prudential regulation and routine access to central bank liquidity.
And while supervision and regulation failed to constrain the build up of leverage and risk, the United States came into this crisis without adequate tools to manage it effectively. Until the Housing and Economic Recovery Act and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act were passed in the summer and fall of 2008, the executive branch had effectively no ability to provide the capital or guarantees necessary to contain the damage caused by the crisis.
And as I discussed before this committee on Tuesday, U.S. law left regulators without good options for managing failures of systemically important non-bank financial institutions.
Regulation of a financial system as complex and dynamic as our system is inherently difficult and challenging. But that difficulty has been compounded by a U.S. regulatory structure that is unnecessarily complex and fragmented. The complexity has sometimes resulted in a failure to assign clear responsibility for achievement of some public policy objectives, notably for financial stability.
Toward a More Stable and Resilient Financial System
Our comprehensive framework for regulatory reform will cover four broad areas: systemic risk, consumer and investor protection, eliminating gaps in our regulatory structure; and international coordination.
In the coming weeks, I will present detailed frameworks for each of these areas. Today, I will discuss in greater detail the need to create tools to identify and mitigate systemic risk, including tools to protect the financial system from the failure of systemically important financial institutions.
Second, weaknesses in our consumer and investor protections harm individuals, undermine trust in our financial system, and can contribute to systemic crises that shake the very foundations of our financial system. The choice of what home mortgage to get or how to save for retirement are some of the most important financial decisions that households make. It is crucial that when households make choices we have clear rules of the road that prevent manipulation and abuse. We must restore integrity to our financial system and strengthen these protections. Consumer and investor protection is a critical component of the President’s regulatory reform plan. We are developing a strong, comprehensive plan for consumer and investor regulation to simplify financial decisions for households and to protect people from unfair and deceptive practices.
We must end the practice of allowing banks and other financial companies to choose their regulator simply by changing their charters; regulators must choose who to regulate. Moreover, our regulatory system must be comprehensive and eliminate gaps in coverage. Our regulatory structure must assign clear regulatory authority, resources, and accountability for each of the key regulatory functions. We must not let turf wars or concerns about the shape of organizational charts prevent us from establishing a substantive system of regulation that meets the needs of the American people.
To match the increasing global markets, we must ensure that global standards for financial regulation are consistent with the high standards we will be implementing in the United States.
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has played an essential role in the effort, working with the world’s standard - setting bodies to study the underlying causes of the crises and address these weaknesses. Much progress is being made to enhance sound regulation, strengthen transparency, and reinforce international collaboration.
We have begun to work with international colleagues to reform and strengthen the FSF so that it can play a more effective role alongside the original Bretton Woods institutions in strengthening the financial system. We have already gotten agreement to expand the membership to include all G-20 countries, giving it a stronger mandate for promoting more robust standards consistent with the principles above, and working with the IMF and the World Bank to monitor the implementation of those standards.
In addition, we will launch a new, initiative to address prudential supervision, tax havens, and money laundering issues in weakly regulated jurisdictions. President Obama will underscore in London on April 2 at the Leaders’ Summit the imperative of raising standards across the globe and encouraging a race to the top rather than a race to the bottom.
Reducing Systemic Risk
The crisis of the past 18 months has exposed critical gaps and weaknesses in our regulatory system. As risks built up, internal risk management systems, rating agencies and regulators simply did not understand or address critical behaviors until they had already resulted in catastrophic losses.
This crisis has made clear that certain large, interconnected firms and markets need to be under a more consistent, and more conservative regulatory regime. These standards cannot simply address the soundness of individual institutions, but must also ensure the stability of the system itself. We need to strengthen our system of prudential supervision across the financial sector. We must require that firms build up capital during good economic times so that they have a more robust protection against losses in down times – and can continue to lend to America’s households and businesses big and small. We need to examine our accounting rules to see whether, consistent with investor protection, we can require firms to build up loan loss reserves that look forward and account for losses in downturns.
In addition, regulators must issue standards for executive compensation practices across all financial firms. These guidelines should encourage prudent risk-taking, incent a focus on long-term performance of the firm rather than short-term profits, and should not otherwise create incentives that overwhelm risk management frameworks.
The key elements of our plan to address systemic risk are:
First, we need to establish a single entity with responsibility for systemic stability over the major institutions and critical payment and settlement systems and activities.
Second, we need to establish and enforce substantially more conservative capital requirements for institutions that pose potential risk to the stability of the financial system, that are designed to dampen rather than amplify financial cycles.
Third, we should require that leveraged private investment funds with assets under management over a certain threshold register with the SEC to provide greater capacity for protecting investors and market integrity.
Fourth, we should establish a comprehensive framework of oversight, protections and disclosure for the OTC derivatives market, moving the standardized parts of those markets to central clearinghouse, and encouraging further use of exchange-traded instruments.
Fifth, the SEC should develop strong requirements for money market funds to reduce the risk of rapid withdrawals of funds that could pose greater risks to market functioning.
And sixth, we need to establish a stronger resolution mechanism that gives the government tools to protect the financial system and the broader economy from the potential failure of large complex financial institutions.
Systemically Important Financial Firms and Markets
To ensure appropriate focus and accountability for financial stability we need to establish a single entity with responsibility for consolidated supervision of systemically important firms and for systemically important payment and settlement systems and activities.
We can no longer allow major financial institutions to choose among consolidated supervision regimes and regulators or to avoid consolidated supervision entirely. That means we must create higher standards for all systemically important financial firms regardless of whether they own a depository institution, to account for the risk that the distress or failure of such a firm could impose on the financial system and the economy. We will work with Congress to enact legislation that defines the characteristics of covered firms, sets objectives and principles for their oversight, and assigns responsibility for regulating these firms.
In identifying systemically important firms, we believe that the characteristics to be considered should include: the financial system’s interdependence with the firm, the firm’s size, leverage (including off-balance sheet exposures), and degree of reliance on short-term funding, and the firm’s the importance of the firm as a source of credit for households, businesses, and governments and as a source of liquidity for the financial system.
In general, the design and degree of conservatism of the prudential requirements applicable to such firms should take into account the inherent inability of regulators to predict future outcomes.
Capital requirements for these firms must be sufficiently robust to be effective farther into the tails of potential outcomes than capital requirements for other financial firms. And they must be less pro-cyclical, requiring firms to build up substantial capital buffers in good economic times so that they can avoid deleveraging in cyclical downturns.
The single systemic regulator will also need to impose liquidity, counterparty, and credit risk management requirements that are more stringent than for other financial firms. For instance, supervisors should apply more demanding liquidity constraints; and require that these firms are able to aggregate counterparty risk exposures on an enterprise basis within a matter of hours.
The regulator of these entities will also need a prompt, corrective action regime that would allow the regulator to force protective actions as regulatory capital levels decline, similar to that of the FDIC with respect to its covered agencies.
Payment and Settlement Activities
Weaknesses in the settlement systems for key funding and risk transfer markets, notably overnight and short-term lending markets (such as those for tri-party repurchase agreements) and OTC derivatives, have been highlighted as a key mechanism that could spread financial distress between institutions and across borders. While some progress was made in the markets for CDS and other OTC derivatives while I was at the New York Fed, federal authority over such arrangements is incomplete and fragmented, and we have been forced to rely heavily on moral suasion to encourage market participants to strengthen these markets.
We need to give a single entity broad and clear authority over systemically important payment and settlement systems and activities. Where such systems or their participants are already federally regulated, the authority of those federal regulators should be preserved and the single entity should consult and coordinate with those regulators.
Hedge Funds and Other Private Pools of Capital
U. S. law generally does not require hedge funds or other private pools of capital to register with a federal financial regulator, although some funds that trade commodity derivatives must register with the CFTC and many funds register voluntarily with the SEC. As a result, there are no reliable, comprehensive data available to assess whether such funds individually or collectively pose a threat to financial stability. However, in the wake of the Madoff episode it is clear that, in order to protect investors, we must close gaps and weaknesses in regulation of investment advisors and the funds they manage.
Accordingly, we recommend that all advisers to hedge funds (and other private pools of capital, including private equity funds and venture capital funds) with assets under management over a certain threshold be required to register with the SEC. All such funds advised by an SEC-registered investment adviser should be subject to investor and counterparty disclosure requirements and regulatory reporting requirements. The regulatory reporting requirements for such funds should require reporting, on a confidential basis, information necessary to assess whether the fund or fund family is so large or highly leveraged that it poses a threat to financial stability. The SEC should share the reports that it receives from the funds with the entity responsible for oversight of systemically important firms, which would then determine whether any hedge funds could pose a systemic threat and should be subjected to the prudential standards outlined above.
Credit Default Swaps and Other OTC Derivatives
The current financial crisis has been amplified by excessive risk-taking by certain insurance companies and poor counterparty credit risk management by many banks trading Credit Default Swaps (CDS) on asset-backed securities. These complex instruments were poorly understood by counterparties, and the implication that they could threaten the entire financial system or bring down a company of the size and scope of AIG was not identified by regulators, in part because the CDS markets lacked transparency.
Let me be clear: the days when a major insurance company could bet the house on credit default swaps with no one watching and no credible backing to protect the company or taxpayers from losses must end.
In our proposed regulatory system, the government will regulate the markets for credit default swaps and over-the-counter derivatives for the first time.
We will subject all dealers in OTC derivative markets and any other firms whose activities in those markets pose a systemic threat to a strong regulatory and supervisory regime as systemically important firms.
We will force all standardized OTC derivative contracts to be cleared through appropriately designed central counterparties (CCPs). We will also encourage greater use of exchange-traded instruments.
The CCPs will be subject to comprehensive settlement systems supervision and oversight, consistent with the authority outlined above.
We will require that all non-standardized derivatives contracts be reported to trade repositories and be subject to robust standards for documentation and confirmation of trades, netting, collateral and margin practices, and close-out practices.
We will bring unparalleled transparency to the OTC derivatives markets by requiring CCPs and trade repositories to make aggregate data on trading volumes and positions available to the public and make individual counterparty trade and position data available on a confidential basis to federal regulators, including those with responsibilities for market integrity.
Finally, we will strengthen participant eligibility requirements and, where appropriate, introduce disclosure or suitability requirements, and we will require all market participants to meet recordkeeping and reporting requirements.
Money Market Mutual Funds (MMFs)
In the wake of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, we learned that even one of the most stable and least risky investment vehicles - money market mutual funds - was not safe from the failure of a systemically important institution. These funds are subject to strict regulation by the SEC and are billed as having a stable asset value - a dollar invested will always return the same amount. But when a major prime MMF “broke the buck” - lost money - the event sparked sharp withdrawals across the entire prime MMF industry. Those withdrawals resulted in severe liquidity pressures, not only on prime MMFs but also on financial and non-financial companies that relied significantly on MMFs for funding. The vulnerability of MMFs to breaking the buck and the susceptibility of the entire prime MMF industry to sharp withdrawals in such circumstances remains a significant source of systemic risk.
We believe that the SEC should strengthen the regulatory framework around MMFs in order to reduce the credit and liquidity risk profile of individual MMFs and to make the MMF industry as a whole is less susceptible to runs.
Resolution Authority
As I discussed on Tuesday, we must create a resolution regime that provides authority to avoid the disorderly liquidation of any nonbank financial firm whose disorderly liquidation would have serious adverse effects on the financial system or the U.S. economy.
Please note that the draft resolution legislation we have submitted is a first step intended to address a significant void in today's regulatory structure. This mechanism is intended to be a permanent authority and therefore, will also be a critical element of Treasury's broader regulatory reform proposals. As we move forward on those proposals, we will need to align the draft legislation with the broader regulatory reform effort as it develops. At this point, however, I will focus on how the authority and mechanism would work within our current regulatory framework.
We must cover financial institutions that have the potential to pose systemic risks to our economy but that are not currently subject to the resolution authority of the FDIC. This would include bank and thrift holding companies and holding companies that control broker-dealers, insurance companies, and futures commission merchants, or any other financial firm posing substantial risk to our economy.
Before any of the emergency measures specified could be taken, the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the positive recommendations of both the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC and in consultation with the President, would have to make a triggering determination that (1) the financial institution in question is in danger of becoming insolvent; (2) its insolvency would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability in the United States; and (3) taking emergency action as provided for in the law would avoid or mitigate those adverse effects.
The Treasury and the FDIC would decide whether to provide financial assistance to the institution or to put it into conservatorship/receivership. This decision will be informed by the recommendations of the Federal Reserve Board and the appropriate federal regulatory agency (if different from the FDIC). The U.S. government would be permitted to utilize a number of different forms of financial assistance in order to stabilize the institution in question. These include making loans to the financial institution in question, purchasing its obligations or assets, assuming or guaranteeing its liabilities, and purchasing an equity interest in the institution.
This authority is modeled on the resolution authority that the FDIC has under current law with respect to banks and that the Federal Housing Finance Agency has with regard to the GSEs. Here, conservatorships or receiverships aim to minimize the impact of the potential failure of the financial institution on the financial system and consumers as a whole, rather than simply addressing the rights of the institution’s creditors as in bankruptcy.
Depending on the circumstances, the FDIC and the Treasury would place the firm into conservatorship with the aim of returning it to private hands or a receivership that would manage the process of winding down the firm. The trustee of the conservatorship or receivership would have broad powers, including to sell or transfer the assets or liabilities of the institution in question, to renegotiate or repudiate the institution’s contracts (including with its employees), and to deal with a derivatives book. A conservator would also have the power to fundamentally restructure the institution by, for example, replacing its board of directors and its senior officers. None of these actions would be subject to the approval of the institution’s creditors or other stakeholders.
The proposed legislation would create an appropriate mechanism to fund the appropriately limited exercise of the resolution authorities it confers. This could take the form of a mandatory appropriation to the FDIC out of the general fund of the Treasury (subject to all the restrictions on the use of appropriated funds, including apportionments under the Anti-Deficiency Act), and/or through a scheme of assessments, ex ante or ex post, on the financial institutions covered by the legislation. The government would also receive repayment from the redemption of any loans made to the financial institution in question, and from the ultimate sale of any equity interest taken by the government in the institution. The Deposit Insurance Fund will not be used to fund such assistance.
Conclusion
The President has made clear that we will do what is necessary to stabilize the financial system and restore the conditions for economic growth. Working closely with the Congress, we have moved quickly and with forceful action to help get people back to work and the economy growing again. With your help we are also moving to repair the financial system so that it works for, rather than against, recovery.
Comprehensive regulatory reform is critical to these efforts. In the coming days and weeks, we will continue to lay out the steps we must take to protect against systemic risk. We will also lay out a detailed framework for stronger rules to protect consumers and investors against fraud and abuse.
Next week I will join President Obama in London for the G-20 leaders meeting to build support - with the help of other interested nations and strengthened international bodies -for higher global standards for financial regulation.
We are a strong and resilient country. We came into the current crisis without the authority and tools we needed to contain the damage to the economy from the financial crisis. We are moving to ensure that we are equipped with both in the future, and in the process, that we modernize our 20th century regulatory system meet 21st century financial challenges.
Below is Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner's Written Testimony to the House Financial Services Committee Hearing on financial regulatory reform:
Thank you Chairman Frank, Ranking Member Bachus, and other members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify about the critical topic of financial regulatory reform.
Over the past 18 months, we have faced the most severe global financial crisis in generations. Some of the world’s largest financial institutions have failed. Equity and real estate prices have fallen sharply, eroding the value of our savings. The supply of credit has tightened dramatically. Confidence in the overall financial system, in the protections it is supposed to afford for investors and consumers, has eroded. These financial pressures have intensified the recession now underway around the world.
And as in any financial crisis, the damage falls on Main Street. It affects the vulnerable. It affects those who were conservative and responsible, not just those who took too much risk.
Our system is wrapped today in extraordinary complexity, but beneath all that, financial systems serve an essential and basic function. Financial institutions and markets transform the earnings and savings of American workers into the loans that finance a home, a new car or a college education. They exist to allocate savings and investment to their most productive uses.
Our financial system does this better than any other financial system in the world, but our system failed in basic fundamental ways. The system proved too unstable and fragile, subject to significant crises every few years, periodic booms in real estate markets and in credit, followed by busts and contraction. Innovation and complexity overwhelmed the checks and balances in the system. Compensation practices rewarded short-term profits over long-term return. We saw huge gains in increased access to credit for large parts of the American economy, but those gains were overshadowed by pervasive failures in consumer protection, leaving many Americans with obligations they did not understand and could not sustain. The huge apparent returns to financial activity attracted fraud on a dramatic scale. Large amounts of leverage and risk were created both within and outside the regulated part of the financial system.
These failures have caused a great loss of confidence in the basic fabric of our financial system, a system that over time has been a tremendous asset for the American economy.
To address this will require comprehensive reform. Not modest repairs at the margin, but new rules of the game. The new rules must be simpler and more effectively enforced and produce a more stable system, that protects consumers and investors, that rewards innovation and that is able to adapt and evolve with changes in the financial market.
On February 25, after meeting with the banking and financial services leadership from Congress, President Obama directed his economic team to develop recommendations for financial regulatory reform and to begin the process of working with the Congress on new legislation. The Treasury Department has been working with the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) to develop a comprehensive plan of reform. This effort has been and will be guided by principles the President set forth earlier this year and in his speech as a candidate at Cooper Union in March 2008.
Financial institutions and markets that are critical to the functioning of the financial system and that could pose serious risks to the stability of the financial system need to be subject to strong oversight by the government. Our financial system and the major centralized markets must be strong and resilient enough to withstand very severe shocks and the failure of one or more large institutions. We need much stronger standards for openness, transparency, and plain, common sense language throughout the financial system. And we need strong and uniform supervision for all financial products marketed to consumers and investors, and tough enforcement of the rules to ensure full accountability for those who violate the public trust.
Financial products and institutions should be regulated for the economic function they provide and the risks they present, not the legal form they take. We can’t allow institutions to cherry pick among competing regulators, and shift risk to where it faces the lowest standards and constraints.
And we need to recognize that risk does not respect national borders. We need to prevent national competition to reduce standards and encourage a race to higher standards. Markets are global and high standards at home need to be complemented by strong international standards enforced more evenly and fairly. These are global markets and challenges. Building on these principles, we want to work with Congress to put in place fundamental reforms that create a stronger, more stable system, with much stronger protections for consumers and investors, and a more streamlined, consolidated, and simple oversight framework.
I want to begin that process today by focusing on proposals that are essential to creating a more stable system, with stronger tools to prevent and manage future crises. In this context, my objective is to concentrate on the substance of the reform agenda, rather than the complex and sensitive questions of who should be responsible for what.
Over the next few weeks we will outline proposals in the areas of consumer and investor protection and for reform of regulatory oversight arrangements.
We start with systemic risk, not just because of its obvious importance to our future economic performance, but also because these issues require more cooperation globally, and they will be at the center of the agenda at the upcoming Leaders’ Summit of the G-20 in London on April 2.
These proposals reflect a range of complex and consequential policy choices. They will require careful work and drafting. It is important that we get this right. We recognize there will be many alternative models put forth to achieve the objective we all share of creating a more stable system. And we look forward to working with the Federal Reserve, with the agencies that make up the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, and with the Congress on a package of reforms that we can all support.
The Crisis and Its Fundamental Causes
The current crisis had many causes.
Two decades of sustained economic growth bred widespread complacency among financial intermediaries and investors, lowering borrowing costs and weakening lending standards.
A global boom in savings resulted in large flows of capital into the United States and other markets, pushing down long-term interest rates and pushing up asset prices. The rising market hid Ponzi schemes and other flagrant abuses that should have been detected and eliminated.
In that environment, institutions and investors looked for higher returns by taking on greater exposure to the risk of infrequent but severe losses.
A long period of home price appreciation encouraged borrowers, lenders, and investors to make choices that could only succeed if home prices continued to appreciate. We had a system under which firms encouraged people to take unwise risks on complicated products, with ruinous results for them and for our financial system.
Market discipline failed to constrain dangerous levels of risk-taking throughout the financial system. New financial products were created to meet demand from investors, and the complexity outmatched the risk-management capabilities of even the most sophisticated financial institutions. Financial activity migrated outside the banking system, relying on the assumption that liquidity would always be available.
Regulated institutions held too little capital relative to the risks to which they were exposed. And the combined effects of the requirements for capital, reserves and liquidity amplified rather than dampened financial cycles. This worked to intensify the boom and magnify the bust.
Supervision and regulation failed to prevent these problems. There were failures where regulation was extensive and failures where it was absent.
Regulators were aware that a large share of loans made by banks and other lenders were being originated for distribution to investors through securitizations, but they did not identify the risks caused by explosive growth in complex products based on these products.
Investment banks, large insurance companies, finance companies, and the GSEs were subject to only limited oversight on a consolidated basis, despite the fact that many of those companies owned federally insured depository institutions or had other access to explicit or implicit forms of support from the government. Federal law allowed many institutions to choose among regulatory regimes for consolidated supervision and, not surprisingly, they avoided the stronger regulatory authority applicable to bank holding companies. Those companies and others were highly leveraged or used short-term borrowing to buy long-term assets, yet lacked strong federal prudential regulation and routine access to central bank liquidity.
And while supervision and regulation failed to constrain the build up of leverage and risk, the United States came into this crisis without adequate tools to manage it effectively. Until the Housing and Economic Recovery Act and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act were passed in the summer and fall of 2008, the executive branch had effectively no ability to provide the capital or guarantees necessary to contain the damage caused by the crisis.
And as I discussed before this committee on Tuesday, U.S. law left regulators without good options for managing failures of systemically important non-bank financial institutions.
Regulation of a financial system as complex and dynamic as our system is inherently difficult and challenging. But that difficulty has been compounded by a U.S. regulatory structure that is unnecessarily complex and fragmented. The complexity has sometimes resulted in a failure to assign clear responsibility for achievement of some public policy objectives, notably for financial stability.
Toward a More Stable and Resilient Financial System
Our comprehensive framework for regulatory reform will cover four broad areas: systemic risk, consumer and investor protection, eliminating gaps in our regulatory structure; and international coordination.
In the coming weeks, I will present detailed frameworks for each of these areas. Today, I will discuss in greater detail the need to create tools to identify and mitigate systemic risk, including tools to protect the financial system from the failure of systemically important financial institutions.
Second, weaknesses in our consumer and investor protections harm individuals, undermine trust in our financial system, and can contribute to systemic crises that shake the very foundations of our financial system. The choice of what home mortgage to get or how to save for retirement are some of the most important financial decisions that households make. It is crucial that when households make choices we have clear rules of the road that prevent manipulation and abuse. We must restore integrity to our financial system and strengthen these protections. Consumer and investor protection is a critical component of the President’s regulatory reform plan. We are developing a strong, comprehensive plan for consumer and investor regulation to simplify financial decisions for households and to protect people from unfair and deceptive practices.
We must end the practice of allowing banks and other financial companies to choose their regulator simply by changing their charters; regulators must choose who to regulate. Moreover, our regulatory system must be comprehensive and eliminate gaps in coverage. Our regulatory structure must assign clear regulatory authority, resources, and accountability for each of the key regulatory functions. We must not let turf wars or concerns about the shape of organizational charts prevent us from establishing a substantive system of regulation that meets the needs of the American people.
To match the increasing global markets, we must ensure that global standards for financial regulation are consistent with the high standards we will be implementing in the United States.
The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) has played an essential role in the effort, working with the world’s standard - setting bodies to study the underlying causes of the crises and address these weaknesses. Much progress is being made to enhance sound regulation, strengthen transparency, and reinforce international collaboration.
We have begun to work with international colleagues to reform and strengthen the FSF so that it can play a more effective role alongside the original Bretton Woods institutions in strengthening the financial system. We have already gotten agreement to expand the membership to include all G-20 countries, giving it a stronger mandate for promoting more robust standards consistent with the principles above, and working with the IMF and the World Bank to monitor the implementation of those standards.
In addition, we will launch a new, initiative to address prudential supervision, tax havens, and money laundering issues in weakly regulated jurisdictions. President Obama will underscore in London on April 2 at the Leaders’ Summit the imperative of raising standards across the globe and encouraging a race to the top rather than a race to the bottom.
Reducing Systemic Risk
The crisis of the past 18 months has exposed critical gaps and weaknesses in our regulatory system. As risks built up, internal risk management systems, rating agencies and regulators simply did not understand or address critical behaviors until they had already resulted in catastrophic losses.
This crisis has made clear that certain large, interconnected firms and markets need to be under a more consistent, and more conservative regulatory regime. These standards cannot simply address the soundness of individual institutions, but must also ensure the stability of the system itself. We need to strengthen our system of prudential supervision across the financial sector. We must require that firms build up capital during good economic times so that they have a more robust protection against losses in down times – and can continue to lend to America’s households and businesses big and small. We need to examine our accounting rules to see whether, consistent with investor protection, we can require firms to build up loan loss reserves that look forward and account for losses in downturns.
In addition, regulators must issue standards for executive compensation practices across all financial firms. These guidelines should encourage prudent risk-taking, incent a focus on long-term performance of the firm rather than short-term profits, and should not otherwise create incentives that overwhelm risk management frameworks.
The key elements of our plan to address systemic risk are:
First, we need to establish a single entity with responsibility for systemic stability over the major institutions and critical payment and settlement systems and activities.
Second, we need to establish and enforce substantially more conservative capital requirements for institutions that pose potential risk to the stability of the financial system, that are designed to dampen rather than amplify financial cycles.
Third, we should require that leveraged private investment funds with assets under management over a certain threshold register with the SEC to provide greater capacity for protecting investors and market integrity.
Fourth, we should establish a comprehensive framework of oversight, protections and disclosure for the OTC derivatives market, moving the standardized parts of those markets to central clearinghouse, and encouraging further use of exchange-traded instruments.
Fifth, the SEC should develop strong requirements for money market funds to reduce the risk of rapid withdrawals of funds that could pose greater risks to market functioning.
And sixth, we need to establish a stronger resolution mechanism that gives the government tools to protect the financial system and the broader economy from the potential failure of large complex financial institutions.
Systemically Important Financial Firms and Markets
To ensure appropriate focus and accountability for financial stability we need to establish a single entity with responsibility for consolidated supervision of systemically important firms and for systemically important payment and settlement systems and activities.
We can no longer allow major financial institutions to choose among consolidated supervision regimes and regulators or to avoid consolidated supervision entirely. That means we must create higher standards for all systemically important financial firms regardless of whether they own a depository institution, to account for the risk that the distress or failure of such a firm could impose on the financial system and the economy. We will work with Congress to enact legislation that defines the characteristics of covered firms, sets objectives and principles for their oversight, and assigns responsibility for regulating these firms.
In identifying systemically important firms, we believe that the characteristics to be considered should include: the financial system’s interdependence with the firm, the firm’s size, leverage (including off-balance sheet exposures), and degree of reliance on short-term funding, and the firm’s the importance of the firm as a source of credit for households, businesses, and governments and as a source of liquidity for the financial system.
In general, the design and degree of conservatism of the prudential requirements applicable to such firms should take into account the inherent inability of regulators to predict future outcomes.
Capital requirements for these firms must be sufficiently robust to be effective farther into the tails of potential outcomes than capital requirements for other financial firms. And they must be less pro-cyclical, requiring firms to build up substantial capital buffers in good economic times so that they can avoid deleveraging in cyclical downturns.
The single systemic regulator will also need to impose liquidity, counterparty, and credit risk management requirements that are more stringent than for other financial firms. For instance, supervisors should apply more demanding liquidity constraints; and require that these firms are able to aggregate counterparty risk exposures on an enterprise basis within a matter of hours.
The regulator of these entities will also need a prompt, corrective action regime that would allow the regulator to force protective actions as regulatory capital levels decline, similar to that of the FDIC with respect to its covered agencies.
Payment and Settlement Activities
Weaknesses in the settlement systems for key funding and risk transfer markets, notably overnight and short-term lending markets (such as those for tri-party repurchase agreements) and OTC derivatives, have been highlighted as a key mechanism that could spread financial distress between institutions and across borders. While some progress was made in the markets for CDS and other OTC derivatives while I was at the New York Fed, federal authority over such arrangements is incomplete and fragmented, and we have been forced to rely heavily on moral suasion to encourage market participants to strengthen these markets.
We need to give a single entity broad and clear authority over systemically important payment and settlement systems and activities. Where such systems or their participants are already federally regulated, the authority of those federal regulators should be preserved and the single entity should consult and coordinate with those regulators.
Hedge Funds and Other Private Pools of Capital
U. S. law generally does not require hedge funds or other private pools of capital to register with a federal financial regulator, although some funds that trade commodity derivatives must register with the CFTC and many funds register voluntarily with the SEC. As a result, there are no reliable, comprehensive data available to assess whether such funds individually or collectively pose a threat to financial stability. However, in the wake of the Madoff episode it is clear that, in order to protect investors, we must close gaps and weaknesses in regulation of investment advisors and the funds they manage.
Accordingly, we recommend that all advisers to hedge funds (and other private pools of capital, including private equity funds and venture capital funds) with assets under management over a certain threshold be required to register with the SEC. All such funds advised by an SEC-registered investment adviser should be subject to investor and counterparty disclosure requirements and regulatory reporting requirements. The regulatory reporting requirements for such funds should require reporting, on a confidential basis, information necessary to assess whether the fund or fund family is so large or highly leveraged that it poses a threat to financial stability. The SEC should share the reports that it receives from the funds with the entity responsible for oversight of systemically important firms, which would then determine whether any hedge funds could pose a systemic threat and should be subjected to the prudential standards outlined above.
Credit Default Swaps and Other OTC Derivatives
The current financial crisis has been amplified by excessive risk-taking by certain insurance companies and poor counterparty credit risk management by many banks trading Credit Default Swaps (CDS) on asset-backed securities. These complex instruments were poorly understood by counterparties, and the implication that they could threaten the entire financial system or bring down a company of the size and scope of AIG was not identified by regulators, in part because the CDS markets lacked transparency.
Let me be clear: the days when a major insurance company could bet the house on credit default swaps with no one watching and no credible backing to protect the company or taxpayers from losses must end.
In our proposed regulatory system, the government will regulate the markets for credit default swaps and over-the-counter derivatives for the first time.
We will subject all dealers in OTC derivative markets and any other firms whose activities in those markets pose a systemic threat to a strong regulatory and supervisory regime as systemically important firms.
We will force all standardized OTC derivative contracts to be cleared through appropriately designed central counterparties (CCPs). We will also encourage greater use of exchange-traded instruments.
The CCPs will be subject to comprehensive settlement systems supervision and oversight, consistent with the authority outlined above.
We will require that all non-standardized derivatives contracts be reported to trade repositories and be subject to robust standards for documentation and confirmation of trades, netting, collateral and margin practices, and close-out practices.
We will bring unparalleled transparency to the OTC derivatives markets by requiring CCPs and trade repositories to make aggregate data on trading volumes and positions available to the public and make individual counterparty trade and position data available on a confidential basis to federal regulators, including those with responsibilities for market integrity.
Finally, we will strengthen participant eligibility requirements and, where appropriate, introduce disclosure or suitability requirements, and we will require all market participants to meet recordkeeping and reporting requirements.
Money Market Mutual Funds (MMFs)
In the wake of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, we learned that even one of the most stable and least risky investment vehicles - money market mutual funds - was not safe from the failure of a systemically important institution. These funds are subject to strict regulation by the SEC and are billed as having a stable asset value - a dollar invested will always return the same amount. But when a major prime MMF “broke the buck” - lost money - the event sparked sharp withdrawals across the entire prime MMF industry. Those withdrawals resulted in severe liquidity pressures, not only on prime MMFs but also on financial and non-financial companies that relied significantly on MMFs for funding. The vulnerability of MMFs to breaking the buck and the susceptibility of the entire prime MMF industry to sharp withdrawals in such circumstances remains a significant source of systemic risk.
We believe that the SEC should strengthen the regulatory framework around MMFs in order to reduce the credit and liquidity risk profile of individual MMFs and to make the MMF industry as a whole is less susceptible to runs.
Resolution Authority
As I discussed on Tuesday, we must create a resolution regime that provides authority to avoid the disorderly liquidation of any nonbank financial firm whose disorderly liquidation would have serious adverse effects on the financial system or the U.S. economy.
Please note that the draft resolution legislation we have submitted is a first step intended to address a significant void in today's regulatory structure. This mechanism is intended to be a permanent authority and therefore, will also be a critical element of Treasury's broader regulatory reform proposals. As we move forward on those proposals, we will need to align the draft legislation with the broader regulatory reform effort as it develops. At this point, however, I will focus on how the authority and mechanism would work within our current regulatory framework.
We must cover financial institutions that have the potential to pose systemic risks to our economy but that are not currently subject to the resolution authority of the FDIC. This would include bank and thrift holding companies and holding companies that control broker-dealers, insurance companies, and futures commission merchants, or any other financial firm posing substantial risk to our economy.
Before any of the emergency measures specified could be taken, the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the positive recommendations of both the Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC and in consultation with the President, would have to make a triggering determination that (1) the financial institution in question is in danger of becoming insolvent; (2) its insolvency would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability in the United States; and (3) taking emergency action as provided for in the law would avoid or mitigate those adverse effects.
The Treasury and the FDIC would decide whether to provide financial assistance to the institution or to put it into conservatorship/receivership. This decision will be informed by the recommendations of the Federal Reserve Board and the appropriate federal regulatory agency (if different from the FDIC). The U.S. government would be permitted to utilize a number of different forms of financial assistance in order to stabilize the institution in question. These include making loans to the financial institution in question, purchasing its obligations or assets, assuming or guaranteeing its liabilities, and purchasing an equity interest in the institution.
This authority is modeled on the resolution authority that the FDIC has under current law with respect to banks and that the Federal Housing Finance Agency has with regard to the GSEs. Here, conservatorships or receiverships aim to minimize the impact of the potential failure of the financial institution on the financial system and consumers as a whole, rather than simply addressing the rights of the institution’s creditors as in bankruptcy.
Depending on the circumstances, the FDIC and the Treasury would place the firm into conservatorship with the aim of returning it to private hands or a receivership that would manage the process of winding down the firm. The trustee of the conservatorship or receivership would have broad powers, including to sell or transfer the assets or liabilities of the institution in question, to renegotiate or repudiate the institution’s contracts (including with its employees), and to deal with a derivatives book. A conservator would also have the power to fundamentally restructure the institution by, for example, replacing its board of directors and its senior officers. None of these actions would be subject to the approval of the institution’s creditors or other stakeholders.
The proposed legislation would create an appropriate mechanism to fund the appropriately limited exercise of the resolution authorities it confers. This could take the form of a mandatory appropriation to the FDIC out of the general fund of the Treasury (subject to all the restrictions on the use of appropriated funds, including apportionments under the Anti-Deficiency Act), and/or through a scheme of assessments, ex ante or ex post, on the financial institutions covered by the legislation. The government would also receive repayment from the redemption of any loans made to the financial institution in question, and from the ultimate sale of any equity interest taken by the government in the institution. The Deposit Insurance Fund will not be used to fund such assistance.
Conclusion
The President has made clear that we will do what is necessary to stabilize the financial system and restore the conditions for economic growth. Working closely with the Congress, we have moved quickly and with forceful action to help get people back to work and the economy growing again. With your help we are also moving to repair the financial system so that it works for, rather than against, recovery.
Comprehensive regulatory reform is critical to these efforts. In the coming days and weeks, we will continue to lay out the steps we must take to protect against systemic risk. We will also lay out a detailed framework for stronger rules to protect consumers and investors against fraud and abuse.
Next week I will join President Obama in London for the G-20 leaders meeting to build support - with the help of other interested nations and strengthened international bodies -for higher global standards for financial regulation.
We are a strong and resilient country. We came into the current crisis without the authority and tools we needed to contain the damage to the economy from the financial crisis. We are moving to ensure that we are equipped with both in the future, and in the process, that we modernize our 20th century regulatory system meet 21st century financial challenges.
Wednesday, March 25, 2009
Bigger than Enron ..just this alone is 2 Billion
Isn't that funny.....all the ignorant reporters kept writing 1.9 Billion Fraud!
Now they are going after 2 Billion from one investment bank> What gives?
Credit Suisse played an important part in an alleged fraud ?
What about JPMorgan, Chase, Citi, blah blah blah....
Investors in the failed National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. aren’t the only ones going after Credit Suisse, the investment bank that issued the Dublin company’s AAA-rated notes.
U.S. District Judge James Graham in Columbus this month allowed a litigation trust formed in the wake of National Century’s bankruptcy to pursue about $2 billion in claims against Credit Suisse. The company had been seeking to dismiss the case.
The trust has alleged Credit Suisse played an important part in an alleged fraud that led to about $2 billion in investment losses and sparked bankruptcy for its subsidiaries.
A federal probe into National Century has led to convictions of or guilty pleas from 10 of 11 former executives targeted in the investigation. The company bought lump sums of unpaid bills from health-care companies and sold the receivables as securities to be backed by the collections, but the probe found National Century executives were taking money for personal use by investing in uncollectible or nonexistent receivables.
While the criminal case against several former executives was pending, Graham in December 2007 refused to dismiss most claims against Credit Suisse from institutional investors who had alleged the investment bank knew the notes it marketed and sold were worthless.
The bank in the action filed by the litigation trust unsuccessfully argued the National Century fraud did harm only to investors represented in the other lawsuit, leaving the trust with no grounds for its claims.
Credit Suisse has argued it wasn’t liable because it didn’t make misrepresentations to clients and didn’t have knowledge of the fraud. Officials for the company declined to comment for this report.
Robert Madden, a partner at Houston-based Gibbs & Bruns LLP representing the trust and the largest group of investors within the related suit, said both cases are now running on roughly parallel tracks after the latest refusal to dismiss the suit. Discovery is complete for both cases and, barring a summary judgment, they’ll be headed to trial.
Now they are going after 2 Billion from one investment bank> What gives?
Credit Suisse played an important part in an alleged fraud ?
What about JPMorgan, Chase, Citi, blah blah blah....
Investors in the failed National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. aren’t the only ones going after Credit Suisse, the investment bank that issued the Dublin company’s AAA-rated notes.
U.S. District Judge James Graham in Columbus this month allowed a litigation trust formed in the wake of National Century’s bankruptcy to pursue about $2 billion in claims against Credit Suisse. The company had been seeking to dismiss the case.
The trust has alleged Credit Suisse played an important part in an alleged fraud that led to about $2 billion in investment losses and sparked bankruptcy for its subsidiaries.
A federal probe into National Century has led to convictions of or guilty pleas from 10 of 11 former executives targeted in the investigation. The company bought lump sums of unpaid bills from health-care companies and sold the receivables as securities to be backed by the collections, but the probe found National Century executives were taking money for personal use by investing in uncollectible or nonexistent receivables.
While the criminal case against several former executives was pending, Graham in December 2007 refused to dismiss most claims against Credit Suisse from institutional investors who had alleged the investment bank knew the notes it marketed and sold were worthless.
The bank in the action filed by the litigation trust unsuccessfully argued the National Century fraud did harm only to investors represented in the other lawsuit, leaving the trust with no grounds for its claims.
Credit Suisse has argued it wasn’t liable because it didn’t make misrepresentations to clients and didn’t have knowledge of the fraud. Officials for the company declined to comment for this report.
Robert Madden, a partner at Houston-based Gibbs & Bruns LLP representing the trust and the largest group of investors within the related suit, said both cases are now running on roughly parallel tracks after the latest refusal to dismiss the suit. Discovery is complete for both cases and, barring a summary judgment, they’ll be headed to trial.
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
The only true statement in this AP article is
Almost $400,000 seized in Ohio fraud case
By ANDREW WELSH-HUGGINS – 21 hours ago
This is misleaduing and WRONG!COLUMBUS, Ohio (AP) — A fugitive convicted in a $1.9 billion corporate fraud scheme put aside almost $400,000 in a bank account before she disappeared, money her trial attorney said he knew nothing about.
Rebecca Parrett, who has been on the lam nearly a year, gave the money to another attorney after removing it from an escrow account, according to federal court documents. But on Friday, U.S. District Court Judge Algenon Marbley said the funds should be seized from an Arizona bank account used by Parrett, 60, a former executive with National Century Financial Enterprises.
The government could use the money to provide restitution to investors who lost money.
Parrett, who will be sentenced Friday in absentia, faces up to 60 years in prison. She disappeared last March after her conviction on 13 counts of securities and wire fraud and money laundering while she worked for National Century in suburban Columbus. Prosecutors likened the fraud, which involved misleading investors and fabricating data, to the Enron or WorldCom scandals.
Arizona attorney Seymour Sacks told the U.S. marshals that Parrett had given him $350,000 from an escrow account, the warrant said. Sacks said he refused to turn the money over to Parrett's husband and son when they requested it after she disappeared, according to the warrant.
Gregory Peterson, who represented Parrett at trial, said he only learned of the money's existence after his client disappeared.
"I was not aware of any money she had anywhere," Peterson said Monday, repeating that he didn't know where his client was.
Parrett's sentencing in absentia will come a few hours before Marbley sentences Lance Poulsen, National Century's founder and former chief executive.
The sentencings are the latest chapter in the downfall of what was once the country's largest health care financing company. Since the FBI raided its offices in 2002, at least nine former executives have been convicted of corporate fraud.
At its height the company employed more than 300 people, most of them in the Columbus area. Executives made millions, with Poulsen alone earning more than $9.1 million between 1996 and 2002, according to the government.
National Century offered financing to small hospitals, nursing homes and other health care providers by purchasing their accounts receivable, usually for 80 or 90 cents on the dollar, so they wouldn't have to wait for insurance payments. National Century then collected the full amount of the payments.
The company raised the money to fund its business by selling bonds to investors. It declared bankruptcy in 2002 after the FBI raid.
Copyright © 2009 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
By ANDREW WELSH-HUGGINS – 21 hours ago
This is misleaduing and WRONG!COLUMBUS, Ohio (AP) — A fugitive convicted in a $1.9 billion corporate fraud scheme put aside almost $400,000 in a bank account before she disappeared, money her trial attorney said he knew nothing about.
Rebecca Parrett, who has been on the lam nearly a year, gave the money to another attorney after removing it from an escrow account, according to federal court documents. But on Friday, U.S. District Court Judge Algenon Marbley said the funds should be seized from an Arizona bank account used by Parrett, 60, a former executive with National Century Financial Enterprises.
The government could use the money to provide restitution to investors who lost money.
Parrett, who will be sentenced Friday in absentia, faces up to 60 years in prison. She disappeared last March after her conviction on 13 counts of securities and wire fraud and money laundering while she worked for National Century in suburban Columbus. Prosecutors likened the fraud, which involved misleading investors and fabricating data, to the Enron or WorldCom scandals.
Arizona attorney Seymour Sacks told the U.S. marshals that Parrett had given him $350,000 from an escrow account, the warrant said. Sacks said he refused to turn the money over to Parrett's husband and son when they requested it after she disappeared, according to the warrant.
Gregory Peterson, who represented Parrett at trial, said he only learned of the money's existence after his client disappeared.
"I was not aware of any money she had anywhere," Peterson said Monday, repeating that he didn't know where his client was.
Parrett's sentencing in absentia will come a few hours before Marbley sentences Lance Poulsen, National Century's founder and former chief executive.
The sentencings are the latest chapter in the downfall of what was once the country's largest health care financing company. Since the FBI raided its offices in 2002, at least nine former executives have been convicted of corporate fraud.
At its height the company employed more than 300 people, most of them in the Columbus area. Executives made millions, with Poulsen alone earning more than $9.1 million between 1996 and 2002, according to the government.
National Century offered financing to small hospitals, nursing homes and other health care providers by purchasing their accounts receivable, usually for 80 or 90 cents on the dollar, so they wouldn't have to wait for insurance payments. National Century then collected the full amount of the payments.
The company raised the money to fund its business by selling bonds to investors. It declared bankruptcy in 2002 after the FBI raid.
Copyright © 2009 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
Friday, March 20, 2009
AIG POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
March 8, 2004
AIG, Citigroup Battle Unions on Political Donation Disclosure
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=arBbK7iUfgPM&refer=us
Merrill Backs Bush
Bush derives much of his campaign donations from executives at publicly traded companies, with employees at Merrill Lynch & Co., UBS AG and MBNA Corp. among those making up 13 of his top 20 donors last year, contributing $2.9 million.
Six of the top 20 donors to Senator John Kerry, who has clinched the Democratic Party's presidential nomination, were employees of listed companies, and they gave $275,000 since he began campaigning in January 2003, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.
The shareholder resolutions were filed in December and January by the Service Employees International Union and other affiliates of the AFL-CIO, a federation of 64 unions representing 13 million people. They seek annual reports about corporate donations and ``an accounting of the company's resources, including property and personnel, contributed or donated to'' political parties or candidates.
General Electric
Shareholder proposals included in proxy ballots seldom garner a majority of votes, though a high percentage of favorable returns can send a message to the board, said Sabato at the University of Virginia.
Many of the companies targeted by the proposal asked the SEC to let them exclude the information from their proxies on the grounds that political involvement is part of ordinary business. Warren, New Jersey-based Chubb Corp., which was denied its request to omit the proposal, said in letters to the SEC that the measure would constitute micro-management by shareholders.
``Providing detailed information regarding which members of management influence which decisions about political contributions extends deeply into the company's daily decision- making procedures,'' Chubb wrote.
The SEC denied a request by Wells Fargo & Co. to omit the resolutions from its proxy. Wells Fargo, based in San Francisco, will post its policy on political contributions on its Web site in accordance with the unions' request, said spokeswoman Julia Tunis.
General Electric Co., whose chairman and chief executive officer, Jeffrey Immelt, 48, donated $2,000 to the Bush campaign, included the resolution in its proxy -- along with a recommendation to shareholders to vote against it.
``Because GE is committed to complying with applicable campaign finance laws, including all reporting requirements, we do not believe the report requested in this proposal is necessary,'' the Fairfield, Connecticut-based company said in its proxy.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/18/AR2009031803201.html?wpisrc=newsletter
From 1987 to 2004, the company's financial products unit contributed more than $5 billion to AIG's pretax income. In spring 2005, after I left the company, AIG's credit rating was downgraded. It would have been logical for AIG's new management to end or reduce its business of writing credit default swaps because of the risk it faced of having to post billions of dollars in additional collateral in connection with certain credit default protection. Yet AIG ramped up its credit default swaps business; significantly, the quality of the securities AIG wrote credit protection for deteriorated, and the company plunged into subprime mortgages. The results were disastrous.
AIG, Citigroup Battle Unions on Political Donation Disclosure
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=arBbK7iUfgPM&refer=us
Merrill Backs Bush
Bush derives much of his campaign donations from executives at publicly traded companies, with employees at Merrill Lynch & Co., UBS AG and MBNA Corp. among those making up 13 of his top 20 donors last year, contributing $2.9 million.
Six of the top 20 donors to Senator John Kerry, who has clinched the Democratic Party's presidential nomination, were employees of listed companies, and they gave $275,000 since he began campaigning in January 2003, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.
The shareholder resolutions were filed in December and January by the Service Employees International Union and other affiliates of the AFL-CIO, a federation of 64 unions representing 13 million people. They seek annual reports about corporate donations and ``an accounting of the company's resources, including property and personnel, contributed or donated to'' political parties or candidates.
General Electric
Shareholder proposals included in proxy ballots seldom garner a majority of votes, though a high percentage of favorable returns can send a message to the board, said Sabato at the University of Virginia.
Many of the companies targeted by the proposal asked the SEC to let them exclude the information from their proxies on the grounds that political involvement is part of ordinary business. Warren, New Jersey-based Chubb Corp., which was denied its request to omit the proposal, said in letters to the SEC that the measure would constitute micro-management by shareholders.
``Providing detailed information regarding which members of management influence which decisions about political contributions extends deeply into the company's daily decision- making procedures,'' Chubb wrote.
The SEC denied a request by Wells Fargo & Co. to omit the resolutions from its proxy. Wells Fargo, based in San Francisco, will post its policy on political contributions on its Web site in accordance with the unions' request, said spokeswoman Julia Tunis.
General Electric Co., whose chairman and chief executive officer, Jeffrey Immelt, 48, donated $2,000 to the Bush campaign, included the resolution in its proxy -- along with a recommendation to shareholders to vote against it.
``Because GE is committed to complying with applicable campaign finance laws, including all reporting requirements, we do not believe the report requested in this proposal is necessary,'' the Fairfield, Connecticut-based company said in its proxy.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/18/AR2009031803201.html?wpisrc=newsletter
From 1987 to 2004, the company's financial products unit contributed more than $5 billion to AIG's pretax income. In spring 2005, after I left the company, AIG's credit rating was downgraded. It would have been logical for AIG's new management to end or reduce its business of writing credit default swaps because of the risk it faced of having to post billions of dollars in additional collateral in connection with certain credit default protection. Yet AIG ramped up its credit default swaps business; significantly, the quality of the securities AIG wrote credit protection for deteriorated, and the company plunged into subprime mortgages. The results were disastrous.
Wall Street Journal - Richard Scott HEALTHCARE BANDIT
2009-The Wall Street Journal reported that Richard Scott, "the former chief executive of HCA Inc," had formed the non-profit organization Conservatives for Patients' Rights as part of a "lobbying campaign to derail or modify" President Obama's health care proposals, but failed to note that Scott resigned from HCA in 1997 amid a federal investigation into the company's Medicare billing, physician recruiting, and home-care practices. HCA eventually pleaded guilty to fraud charges and paid approximately $1.7 billion in fines and penalties.
THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 2003; WWW.USDOJ.GOV;
WASHINGTON, D.C.
HCA Inc. (formerly known as Columbia/HCA and HCA - The Healthcare Company)
LARGEST HEALTH CARE FRAUD CASE IN U.S. HISTORY SETTLED; HCA INVESTIGATION NETS RECORD TOTAL OF $1.7 BILLION
Note: Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) was acquired by Columbia in 1994.
Why does this matter? The wrath of Richard Scott and friends is to this day still affecting main street America.
Who is Richard Scott? More importantly, who are Richard Rainwater & his wife, Darla Moore?
Before GW Bush was affiliated with Richard Rainwater may I remind you-Richard Scott was the ex-partner of Richard Rainwater with Columbia Homecare Group.
In 1997, Fortune magazine ran a cover story on successful business executive Darla Moore, titled "The Toughest Babe in Business."….She created the corporate bankruptcy finance tool, DIP, debtor in possession while at a Wall Street bank.
Columbia/HCA is a partnership of financier Richard Rainwater of Ft. Worth and lawyer Richard Scott. Scott was recently terminated by Darla Moore, the wife of Richard Rainwater and according to Fortune Magazine, the “Toughest Babe in the Business”.
As part of Richard Scott's severance package from Columbia he was paid $5.13 million and given a five year consulting contract at $950,000 per year. His former president, Mr. Vandewater was paid $3.24 million and given a five year consulting contract at $600,000 per year.
Both former executives are allowed to exercise vested stock options within 90 days. Scott owned or had options on 9.4 million shares of Columbia stock as of May, 1997. Vanderwater controlled 617,375 shares. Columbia has agreed to pay attorney's fees and any fines or judgments against the two. In addition, the two former executives get their office expenses paid for two years including secretaries. If they move within the next two years their moving expenses are paid by Columbia/HCA. Not a bad deal for someone who just got fired! Wow! What a surprise!
Rainwater also owned a large stake in Magellan Health Care which controls Charter Medical. Magellan, run by Darla Moore, is the largest network of psychiatric hospitals in the country. They are becoming more and more involved in obtaining government money for services formerly not covered as health care, according to Fortune Magazine.
Columbia just decided to sell its home health-care business and its head announced she is forming a company of her own. The home care unit is valued at $ 450 million.
At least two other top executives of Columbia have resigned.
On Sept 8, 1998 Standard and Poors downgraded the bonds of Charter/HCA to negative bases on poor earnings. Looks like Rainwater and his Crescent Cos' have finally stumbled. One source within the company said it would be a long while before any new high-ticket acquisitions would take place. A previous deal with Prudential is in danger of being jettisoned.
Why does this matter- September 8, 1998?
We must review the case that just ended in December 2008 in Columbus Ohio with National Century Financial Enterprises which was headquartered in Dublin, Ohio. It began in 2002 when FBI raided the offices of National Century Financial Enterprises Dublin, Ohio
National Century Financial Enterprises:
“This case is one of the largest corporate fraud investigations involving a privately held company headquartered in small town America,” said Assistant Director Kenneth W. Kaiser of the FBI Criminal Investigative Division.
Just a reminder relating to the need for ‘healthcare financial service’ i.e. (NCFE) National Century Financial Enterprises; home health - which was struggling under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997; about 1,400 agencies closed nationwide in 1998.
3/9/2006
10-K SEC Filing, filed by J P MORGAN CHASE & CO on 3/9/2006: Enron litigation. JPMorgan Chase and certain of its officers and directors are involved in a number of lawsuits arising out of its banking relationships with Enron Corp.; the three current or former Firm employees are sued in their roles as former members of NCFE's board of directors
THURSDAY, JUNE 26, 2003; WWW.USDOJ.GOV;
WASHINGTON, D.C.
HCA Inc. (formerly known as Columbia/HCA and HCA - The Healthcare Company)
LARGEST HEALTH CARE FRAUD CASE IN U.S. HISTORY SETTLED; HCA INVESTIGATION NETS RECORD TOTAL OF $1.7 BILLION
Note: Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) was acquired by Columbia in 1994.
Why does this matter? The wrath of Richard Scott and friends is to this day still affecting main street America.
Who is Richard Scott? More importantly, who are Richard Rainwater & his wife, Darla Moore?
Before GW Bush was affiliated with Richard Rainwater may I remind you-Richard Scott was the ex-partner of Richard Rainwater with Columbia Homecare Group.
In 1997, Fortune magazine ran a cover story on successful business executive Darla Moore, titled "The Toughest Babe in Business."….She created the corporate bankruptcy finance tool, DIP, debtor in possession while at a Wall Street bank.
Columbia/HCA is a partnership of financier Richard Rainwater of Ft. Worth and lawyer Richard Scott. Scott was recently terminated by Darla Moore, the wife of Richard Rainwater and according to Fortune Magazine, the “Toughest Babe in the Business”.
As part of Richard Scott's severance package from Columbia he was paid $5.13 million and given a five year consulting contract at $950,000 per year. His former president, Mr. Vandewater was paid $3.24 million and given a five year consulting contract at $600,000 per year.
Both former executives are allowed to exercise vested stock options within 90 days. Scott owned or had options on 9.4 million shares of Columbia stock as of May, 1997. Vanderwater controlled 617,375 shares. Columbia has agreed to pay attorney's fees and any fines or judgments against the two. In addition, the two former executives get their office expenses paid for two years including secretaries. If they move within the next two years their moving expenses are paid by Columbia/HCA. Not a bad deal for someone who just got fired! Wow! What a surprise!
Rainwater also owned a large stake in Magellan Health Care which controls Charter Medical. Magellan, run by Darla Moore, is the largest network of psychiatric hospitals in the country. They are becoming more and more involved in obtaining government money for services formerly not covered as health care, according to Fortune Magazine.
Columbia just decided to sell its home health-care business and its head announced she is forming a company of her own. The home care unit is valued at $ 450 million.
At least two other top executives of Columbia have resigned.
On Sept 8, 1998 Standard and Poors downgraded the bonds of Charter/HCA to negative bases on poor earnings. Looks like Rainwater and his Crescent Cos' have finally stumbled. One source within the company said it would be a long while before any new high-ticket acquisitions would take place. A previous deal with Prudential is in danger of being jettisoned.
Why does this matter- September 8, 1998?
We must review the case that just ended in December 2008 in Columbus Ohio with National Century Financial Enterprises which was headquartered in Dublin, Ohio. It began in 2002 when FBI raided the offices of National Century Financial Enterprises Dublin, Ohio
National Century Financial Enterprises:
“This case is one of the largest corporate fraud investigations involving a privately held company headquartered in small town America,” said Assistant Director Kenneth W. Kaiser of the FBI Criminal Investigative Division.
Just a reminder relating to the need for ‘healthcare financial service’ i.e. (NCFE) National Century Financial Enterprises; home health - which was struggling under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997; about 1,400 agencies closed nationwide in 1998.
3/9/2006
10-K SEC Filing, filed by J P MORGAN CHASE & CO on 3/9/2006: Enron litigation. JPMorgan Chase and certain of its officers and directors are involved in a number of lawsuits arising out of its banking relationships with Enron Corp.; the three current or former Firm employees are sued in their roles as former members of NCFE's board of directors
Charles Krauthammer-Bigger than Enron
I AM SO CONFUSED!
Did this happen Januaray 20, 2009?
I am guessing NOT!
I say before 1999 even....but let us look:
Ready?
2004
AIG
2004
MERRILL
March 8, 2004
AIG, Citigroup Battle Unions on Political
Donation Disclosure
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=arBbK7iUfgPM&refer=us
Merrill Backs Bush
Bush derives much of his campaign donations from executives at publicly traded companies, with employees at Merrill Lynch & Co., UBS AG and MBNA Corp. among those making up 13 of his top 20 donors last year, contributing $2.9 million.
Six of the top 20 donors to Senator John Kerry, who has clinched the Democratic Party's presidential nomination, were employees of listed companies, and they gave $275,000 since he began campaigning in January 2003, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.
WHO HAD ACCESS IN 2004? AIG or me?
Did this happen Januaray 20, 2009?
I am guessing NOT!
I say before 1999 even....but let us look:
Ready?
2004
AIG
2004
MERRILL
March 8, 2004
AIG, Citigroup Battle Unions on Political
Donation Disclosure
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=arBbK7iUfgPM&refer=us
Merrill Backs Bush
Bush derives much of his campaign donations from executives at publicly traded companies, with employees at Merrill Lynch & Co., UBS AG and MBNA Corp. among those making up 13 of his top 20 donors last year, contributing $2.9 million.
Six of the top 20 donors to Senator John Kerry, who has clinched the Democratic Party's presidential nomination, were employees of listed companies, and they gave $275,000 since he began campaigning in January 2003, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.
WHO HAD ACCESS IN 2004? AIG or me?
Bigger then Enron- Credit Suisse
Credit Suisse Loses Bid To Toss Nat'l Century Suit
Law360, New York (March 19, 2009) -- A federal judge has refused to dismiss a suit against Credit Suisse Securities LLC alleging that it helped National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. run the enormous Ponzi scheme that eventually drove it into bankruptcy.
Judge James L. Graham of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled Wednesday that nearly all claims of the lawsuit, which was filed by a trust...
Law360, New York (March 19, 2009) -- A federal judge has refused to dismiss a suit against Credit Suisse Securities LLC alleging that it helped National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. run the enormous Ponzi scheme that eventually drove it into bankruptcy.
Judge James L. Graham of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled Wednesday that nearly all claims of the lawsuit, which was filed by a trust...
My comment to Tom Daschle's Op-Ed in WaPO
OBAMA says: The epitome of Fraud Waste and Abuse….
I SAY: Root that out and we can afford much more to spend!
PAY ATTENTION PEOPLE
Are you aware of the largest private financial fraud in our country's history that ended December 2008?
WHY?
It was not 'low income housing' mortgages; it was HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL FRAUD; the largest private "FINANCIAL INSTITUTION“in our country.
JULY 10, 2007 - SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT CHARGES EIGHT FORMER EXECUTIVES OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING COMPANY WITH CONSPIRACY, FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDERING
"This case is one of the largest corporate fraud investigations involving a privately held company headquartered in small town America," said FBI Criminal Investigative Division. (Because it was private, no one has ever heard of this case, cried one prosecutor)
A reminder relating to the NEED for ‘healthcare financial service’ i.e. (NCFE) National Century Financial Enterprises; home health - which was struggling under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997; about 1,400 agencies closed nationwide in 1998.
Recall in 1998: On Sept 8, 1998 Standard and Poors downgraded the bonds of Charter/HCA …
The following is an excerpt from a 10-K SEC Filing, filed by J P MORGAN CHASE & CO on 3/9/2006:
the three current or former Firm employees are sued in their roles as former members of NCFE's (National Century Financial Enterprises) board of directors
2002 FBI Raids NCFE headquarters in Dublin Ohio
Prior to the exposure of ‘some’ of the fraud at NCFE, the same entities were also involved in the "LARGEST PRIVATE" Bankruptcy Court in Memphis, TN in 1999. (Another “private’ company; remember, home health - which was struggling under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997)
Guess what this LARGEST PRIVATE Company filing bankruptcy in Tennessee was--- HOME HEALTHCARE!
The SEC NEVER received documentation of the publicly traded companies allegedly selling or divesting their home health units to this private company.
Six months or so later after the acquisition of all the losers, this private healthcare company filing bankruptcy in Tennessee held much of if not ALL of Columbia/HCA Homecare’s losing' assets, home health- financed by the largest fraudulent private "FINANCIAL INSTITUTION “in our country, NCFE.
Tennessee Bankruptcy court transcripts reveal lawyers crying Fraud only to be reprimanded by the appointed corporate bankruptcy judge. She forbade the lawyers from using the ‘F’ (fraud) word in her court. (Got to love those appointed judges) Guess what tool was used in this corporate bankruptcy court in TN? DIP FINANCE TOOL.
March 26, 2008; By Jodi Andes; THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH
Nine other executives have been convicted or pleaded guilty in National Century's collapse. Only Poulsen and executive James Happ still await trial.
Only CEO and ONE EXECUTIVE –JAMES K HAPP await trial? JAMES K HAPP –LAST PERSON ON TRIAL—
WHY?
Who is James K Happ? Where was James K Happ when Richard Scott was at Columbia in 1997?
In 1997 James K Happ was the CFO of the Dallas-based Columbia Homecare Group, Inc. “In this role, he directed the company through the challenging reimbursement climate, known as the interim payment system, and participated in the divestiture of all of Columbia/HCA's home care operations” (SEC Form)
Let me remind you the size and TOO BIG TO FAIL mentality for HCA-Hospital Corporation of America is in Nashville, TN. Remember Senator Bill Frist- Leader of the Senate- HOLY COW!
December 9, 2008. James K. Happ, 48, is charged with conspiracy, money-laundering conspiracy and three counts of wire fraud; the 11th National Century executive to be tried or admit guilt. , Also today, a former friend of Happ's testified that, while working at National Century, Happ boasted that he never could be charged with any fraud because he didn't sign anything.
(Just like Madoff’s sons never signed anything therefore they are not involved.)
December 18, 2008 - The ONE AND ONLY acquittal; James K Happ!
By Jodi Andes THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH
Prosecutors' case fell short, juror says National Century fraud case produces 1st acquittal; The "not guilty" verdicts that came in federal court yesterday were not so much a vindication of the last National Century Financial Enterprises executive to stand trial, a juror said.
Instead, they were more a belief that federal prosecutors had not done their job, the juror said after he and his fellow jurors acquitted James K. Happ of five counts after 12 hours of deliberation. "He very well may have been guilty. A lot of us thought he was," said the juror who wouldn't give his name. "But if he was, you gotta have the evidence."
“Federal prosecutors had not done their job” in 2008?
To be continued…..
I SAY: Root that out and we can afford much more to spend!
PAY ATTENTION PEOPLE
Are you aware of the largest private financial fraud in our country's history that ended December 2008?
WHY?
It was not 'low income housing' mortgages; it was HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL FRAUD; the largest private "FINANCIAL INSTITUTION“in our country.
JULY 10, 2007 - SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT CHARGES EIGHT FORMER EXECUTIVES OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING COMPANY WITH CONSPIRACY, FRAUD, MONEY LAUNDERING
"This case is one of the largest corporate fraud investigations involving a privately held company headquartered in small town America," said FBI Criminal Investigative Division. (Because it was private, no one has ever heard of this case, cried one prosecutor)
A reminder relating to the NEED for ‘healthcare financial service’ i.e. (NCFE) National Century Financial Enterprises; home health - which was struggling under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997; about 1,400 agencies closed nationwide in 1998.
Recall in 1998: On Sept 8, 1998 Standard and Poors downgraded the bonds of Charter/HCA …
The following is an excerpt from a 10-K SEC Filing, filed by J P MORGAN CHASE & CO on 3/9/2006:
the three current or former Firm employees are sued in their roles as former members of NCFE's (National Century Financial Enterprises) board of directors
2002 FBI Raids NCFE headquarters in Dublin Ohio
Prior to the exposure of ‘some’ of the fraud at NCFE, the same entities were also involved in the "LARGEST PRIVATE" Bankruptcy Court in Memphis, TN in 1999. (Another “private’ company; remember, home health - which was struggling under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997)
Guess what this LARGEST PRIVATE Company filing bankruptcy in Tennessee was--- HOME HEALTHCARE!
The SEC NEVER received documentation of the publicly traded companies allegedly selling or divesting their home health units to this private company.
Six months or so later after the acquisition of all the losers, this private healthcare company filing bankruptcy in Tennessee held much of if not ALL of Columbia/HCA Homecare’s losing' assets, home health- financed by the largest fraudulent private "FINANCIAL INSTITUTION “in our country, NCFE.
Tennessee Bankruptcy court transcripts reveal lawyers crying Fraud only to be reprimanded by the appointed corporate bankruptcy judge. She forbade the lawyers from using the ‘F’ (fraud) word in her court. (Got to love those appointed judges) Guess what tool was used in this corporate bankruptcy court in TN? DIP FINANCE TOOL.
March 26, 2008; By Jodi Andes; THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH
Nine other executives have been convicted or pleaded guilty in National Century's collapse. Only Poulsen and executive James Happ still await trial.
Only CEO and ONE EXECUTIVE –JAMES K HAPP await trial? JAMES K HAPP –LAST PERSON ON TRIAL—
WHY?
Who is James K Happ? Where was James K Happ when Richard Scott was at Columbia in 1997?
In 1997 James K Happ was the CFO of the Dallas-based Columbia Homecare Group, Inc. “In this role, he directed the company through the challenging reimbursement climate, known as the interim payment system, and participated in the divestiture of all of Columbia/HCA's home care operations” (SEC Form)
Let me remind you the size and TOO BIG TO FAIL mentality for HCA-Hospital Corporation of America is in Nashville, TN. Remember Senator Bill Frist- Leader of the Senate- HOLY COW!
December 9, 2008. James K. Happ, 48, is charged with conspiracy, money-laundering conspiracy and three counts of wire fraud; the 11th National Century executive to be tried or admit guilt. , Also today, a former friend of Happ's testified that, while working at National Century, Happ boasted that he never could be charged with any fraud because he didn't sign anything.
(Just like Madoff’s sons never signed anything therefore they are not involved.)
December 18, 2008 - The ONE AND ONLY acquittal; James K Happ!
By Jodi Andes THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH
Prosecutors' case fell short, juror says National Century fraud case produces 1st acquittal; The "not guilty" verdicts that came in federal court yesterday were not so much a vindication of the last National Century Financial Enterprises executive to stand trial, a juror said.
Instead, they were more a belief that federal prosecutors had not done their job, the juror said after he and his fellow jurors acquitted James K. Happ of five counts after 12 hours of deliberation. "He very well may have been guilty. A lot of us thought he was," said the juror who wouldn't give his name. "But if he was, you gotta have the evidence."
“Federal prosecutors had not done their job” in 2008?
To be continued…..
Monday, March 16, 2009
Morgan Stanley Grabs Crescent in $6.5B Deal-Is this what AIG securitzed?
Another "Private Deals and Private Equity Boom"
Remember with National National Century Financial Enterprises (NCFE)
'The federal prosecutor noted in the NCFE case: "Ladies and gentlemen, this is a case of staggering fraud," Wise said. "It is one of the largest frauds the FBI has ever investigated."
National Century's collapse never gained much attention outside business circles, largely because it was a privately held company
May 22, 2007Morgan Stanley Grabs Crescent in $6.5B DealMove Underscores Continued Momentum for REIT Take-Private Deals and Private Equity Boom
Crescent Real Estate Equities Co. (NYSE: CEI) has finally found a buyer, and one that seems to like its mixed-use approach. Morgan Stanley Real Estate has agreed to acquire the Fort Worth, Texas-based REIT for a deal that totals $6.5 billion, including the assumption of debt.
Crescent, a mixed-use REIT owned by Texas billionaire Richard Rainwater, was in the midst of morphing itself into a pure-play office REIT. After evaluating its strategic options, the company came to the conclusion that it could "take advantage of the void left by rabid industry consolidation" as a remade office REIT. More likely, it was positioning itself better for an outright sale.
Morgan Stanley will pay $22.80 per share in cash for the REIT, which represents a 12% premium to the prior 30-day average closing price for the stock. But, the premium shrinks to just 5.4% above yesterday's close of $21.62 per share.
The deal also includes the assumption of $3.1 billion of outstanding debt and the redemption of Crescent's outstanding preferred shares. Crescent does not plan to pay any further dividends on the common share. The deal, which is expected to close in the third quarter, is subject to approval by Crescent's shareholders.
"The primary goal of the strategic plan we announced on March 1, 2007 was to maximize value for our shareholders. This transaction accelerates the realization of that goal by delivering value to our shareholders more quickly and with greater certainty. We are delighted to announce this agreement and we look forward to working closely with Morgan Stanley Real Estate on a transition that will be seamless for our customers, partners and employees," said John C. Goff, Crescent's vice chairman and CEO, in a statement.
Prior to the deal with Morgan Stanley, Crescent had set into motion a series of deals, including the $550 million sale of its six hotels plus the 343,664-square-foot Austin Centre office building for $75.5 million to Walton Street Capital LLC in March. It also struck a deal recently to sell a portfolio of Dallas-area office assets to a venture between Trimarchi Management and UBS for about $420 million, according to published reports. Crescent also sold the historic Exchange Building in Seattle for $80.6 million to a joint venture between GE Asset Management and The Ashforth Co. The REIT was preparing to shop its resort and residential development business through JP Morgan and was still evaluating plans for Canyon Ranch, a wellness lifestyle company owned in partnership with Mel Zuckerman and Jerry Cohen.
Crescent's portfolio includes 70 office properties totaling 27 million square feet, with major concentrations in Dallas, Houston, Austin, Denver, Miami and Las Vegas. It also holds a stake in AmeriCold REIT, an owner and operator of refrigerated warehousing, transportation management and other logistical services.
It's not clear what Morgan Stanley will do with the various pieces of Crescent going forward. The financial services firm considers Crescent's "unique" platform complimentary to its own wide range of business lines.
Morgan Stanley has certainly cast a wide net for real estate acquisitions, gobbling up properties and real estate companies in all sectors of the industry, and has been a major force in the take-private deals that have fueled the hot investment sales market over the past two years. Last year, it acquired Town and Country Trust, an apartment REIT, through a venture with Onex Real Estate and Sawyer Realty Holdings LLC, in a deal valued at $1.5 billion. Also in 2006, it paid $1.9 billion to acquire Glenborough Realty Trust, a San Mateo, CA-based office REIT. It recently acquired CNL Hotels & Resorts for about $6.6 billion, including the sale of a portion of the properties to Ashford Hospitality Trust.
The financial firm has also reached into its deep pockets for a plethora of property acquisitions lately. It recently paid about $2.43 billion to buy a portfolio of former EOP assets in San Francisco from Blackstone. It also acquired a 28-story office tower at 2 Park Ave. in Manhattan for $519 million. On the retail side, Morgan Stanley recently formed a joint venture with Inland Western Retail Real Estate Trust Inc. to acquire and manage retail properties in target markets across the U.S. with a goal of building a billion-dollar portfolio.
The Crescent deal just underscores the notion that the private equity boom is still in full swing. According to a New York Times article citing data from Thomson Financial, there have been $281 billion worth of private equity deals in the U.S. so far this year -- that's triple the amount compared to the same period last year, which ended up breaking all sorts of records.
There seems to be plenty of momentum left for REIT take-private deals, too. Year to date, 12 REITs have gone private for a total of $16.2 billion. But, there's still a ways to go to catch up to the lofty levels of 2006, when 23 deals totaling $64.3 billion, including the mammoth EOP buyout, took place, according to SNL Financial data listed in an article by The Wall Street Journal.
Greenhill & Co. LLC served as Crescent's financial advisor and Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP provided legal counsel. Morgan Stanley acted as financial advisor to Morgan Stanley Real Estate with Goodwin Procter LLP and Jones Day providing legal counsel.
Remember with National National Century Financial Enterprises (NCFE)
'The federal prosecutor noted in the NCFE case: "Ladies and gentlemen, this is a case of staggering fraud," Wise said. "It is one of the largest frauds the FBI has ever investigated."
National Century's collapse never gained much attention outside business circles, largely because it was a privately held company
May 22, 2007Morgan Stanley Grabs Crescent in $6.5B DealMove Underscores Continued Momentum for REIT Take-Private Deals and Private Equity Boom
Crescent Real Estate Equities Co. (NYSE: CEI) has finally found a buyer, and one that seems to like its mixed-use approach. Morgan Stanley Real Estate has agreed to acquire the Fort Worth, Texas-based REIT for a deal that totals $6.5 billion, including the assumption of debt.
Crescent, a mixed-use REIT owned by Texas billionaire Richard Rainwater, was in the midst of morphing itself into a pure-play office REIT. After evaluating its strategic options, the company came to the conclusion that it could "take advantage of the void left by rabid industry consolidation" as a remade office REIT. More likely, it was positioning itself better for an outright sale.
Morgan Stanley will pay $22.80 per share in cash for the REIT, which represents a 12% premium to the prior 30-day average closing price for the stock. But, the premium shrinks to just 5.4% above yesterday's close of $21.62 per share.
The deal also includes the assumption of $3.1 billion of outstanding debt and the redemption of Crescent's outstanding preferred shares. Crescent does not plan to pay any further dividends on the common share. The deal, which is expected to close in the third quarter, is subject to approval by Crescent's shareholders.
"The primary goal of the strategic plan we announced on March 1, 2007 was to maximize value for our shareholders. This transaction accelerates the realization of that goal by delivering value to our shareholders more quickly and with greater certainty. We are delighted to announce this agreement and we look forward to working closely with Morgan Stanley Real Estate on a transition that will be seamless for our customers, partners and employees," said John C. Goff, Crescent's vice chairman and CEO, in a statement.
Prior to the deal with Morgan Stanley, Crescent had set into motion a series of deals, including the $550 million sale of its six hotels plus the 343,664-square-foot Austin Centre office building for $75.5 million to Walton Street Capital LLC in March. It also struck a deal recently to sell a portfolio of Dallas-area office assets to a venture between Trimarchi Management and UBS for about $420 million, according to published reports. Crescent also sold the historic Exchange Building in Seattle for $80.6 million to a joint venture between GE Asset Management and The Ashforth Co. The REIT was preparing to shop its resort and residential development business through JP Morgan and was still evaluating plans for Canyon Ranch, a wellness lifestyle company owned in partnership with Mel Zuckerman and Jerry Cohen.
Crescent's portfolio includes 70 office properties totaling 27 million square feet, with major concentrations in Dallas, Houston, Austin, Denver, Miami and Las Vegas. It also holds a stake in AmeriCold REIT, an owner and operator of refrigerated warehousing, transportation management and other logistical services.
It's not clear what Morgan Stanley will do with the various pieces of Crescent going forward. The financial services firm considers Crescent's "unique" platform complimentary to its own wide range of business lines.
Morgan Stanley has certainly cast a wide net for real estate acquisitions, gobbling up properties and real estate companies in all sectors of the industry, and has been a major force in the take-private deals that have fueled the hot investment sales market over the past two years. Last year, it acquired Town and Country Trust, an apartment REIT, through a venture with Onex Real Estate and Sawyer Realty Holdings LLC, in a deal valued at $1.5 billion. Also in 2006, it paid $1.9 billion to acquire Glenborough Realty Trust, a San Mateo, CA-based office REIT. It recently acquired CNL Hotels & Resorts for about $6.6 billion, including the sale of a portion of the properties to Ashford Hospitality Trust.
The financial firm has also reached into its deep pockets for a plethora of property acquisitions lately. It recently paid about $2.43 billion to buy a portfolio of former EOP assets in San Francisco from Blackstone. It also acquired a 28-story office tower at 2 Park Ave. in Manhattan for $519 million. On the retail side, Morgan Stanley recently formed a joint venture with Inland Western Retail Real Estate Trust Inc. to acquire and manage retail properties in target markets across the U.S. with a goal of building a billion-dollar portfolio.
The Crescent deal just underscores the notion that the private equity boom is still in full swing. According to a New York Times article citing data from Thomson Financial, there have been $281 billion worth of private equity deals in the U.S. so far this year -- that's triple the amount compared to the same period last year, which ended up breaking all sorts of records.
There seems to be plenty of momentum left for REIT take-private deals, too. Year to date, 12 REITs have gone private for a total of $16.2 billion. But, there's still a ways to go to catch up to the lofty levels of 2006, when 23 deals totaling $64.3 billion, including the mammoth EOP buyout, took place, according to SNL Financial data listed in an article by The Wall Street Journal.
Greenhill & Co. LLC served as Crescent's financial advisor and Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP provided legal counsel. Morgan Stanley acted as financial advisor to Morgan Stanley Real Estate with Goodwin Procter LLP and Jones Day providing legal counsel.
Thursday, March 12, 2009
Bigger than Enron-Financial FRAUD
How long was Sen Grassley Chairman of the Finance Com? Our financial system went off a cliff Sep 08
Friday, March 6, 2009
November 28, 2006 - Bigger Than Enron
"...spying of former Hewlett-Packard (HP) Chair Patricia Dunn on H-P board members and high tech journalists..."
"...antics of Enron bad boys Andrew Fastow and Jeffrey Skilling, but it's depth and breadth are unsurpassed by anything that happened at Enron or HP."
THIS WAS NOTHING!!
November 28, 2006 by Christine Zibas
"...What is the problem so pervasive that it is overtaking these corporate nosedives? It's stock option backdating, and according to the "Wall Street Journal" in its "scandal scorecard," the number of companies now facing federal investigation is at least 130: the number reporting internal probes: 153; the number of executives or directors resigning or being fired: at least 42, including 10 CEOs; the number criminally charged: 5; and the amount of misstated profits from misdated options: $5.3 billion from more than 60 companies."
"...US Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California formed a special force of prosecutors and FBI agents. According to Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC, "The sheer magnitude of the numbers of companies, executives, and corporate boards that have disclosed options-related investigations in mind-boggling...." Add to that the millions of dollars being spent in the corporate sector by more than 100 companies, and you have a corporate scandal many times larger than anything cooked up by Enron or HP."
Bigger Than Enron? There's a New Corporate Scandal Brewing
Stock Option Backdating Leads to Federal Scrutiny of More Than 130 Companies
Although much recent attention has been given to the spying of former Hewlett-Packard (HP) Chair Patricia Dunn on H-P board members and high tech journalists, a far greater scandal has been brewing that has flown largely under the public's radar. It's not as tawdry as the Hewlett-Packard scandal, and it does not have the cheekiness of the antics of Enron bad boys Andrew Fastow and Jeffrey Skilling, but it's depth and breadth are unsurpassed by anything that happened at Enron or HP. What is the problem so pervasive that it is overtaking these corporate nosedives? It's stock option backdating, and according to the "Wall Street Journal" in its "scandal scorecard," the number of companies now facing federal investigation is at least 130: the number reporting internal probes: 153; the number of executives or directors resigning or being fired: at least 42, including 10 CEOs; the number criminally charged: 5; and the amount of misstated profits from misdated options: $5.3 billion from more than 60 companies. No small potatoes here.
This dirty little secret has been gracing the pages of the "Wall Street Journal" and other business media, but gone largely unnoticed by the general media. Yet this scandal has rocked some of the most successful companies in the American vernacular: Apple, Home Depot, UnitedHealth Group, and a stunning number of Silicon Valley companies, where backdating one's stock options was a "no brainer."
Stock Option Backdating Leads to Federal Scrutiny of More Than 130 Companies
The current investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has become so large that it is now relying on internal investigations by companies to determine just which companies to pursue on federal indictments. What is this scandal all about? In a nutshell, this story centers on the practice of corporate executives improperly affording themselves undeserved wealth through the process of backdating stock options to dates when a company's stock price is low, giving the grant recipient an instant paper profit. Stock options, part of the typical corporate executive's pay pack, allow the executive to buy company stock at a fixed price on a certain, pre-determined date, allowing the executive to profit if the stock rises in value from the date of purchase. How to win at this game? Pick the date with the lowest stock price. How can the executive know that date? Only through backdating, an illegal practice that now has some 70 companies scrambling to restate or reduce their profits because of said illegal practice.
This problem first came to the attention of the federal government more than 3 years ago, when Stephen Cutler, then an enforcement officer at the SEC read an account suggesting that executives has issued options just prior to the release of news so favorable that it caused a significant rise in the company's stock price. Today, the problems are so large that the SEC, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the US Postal Service, and 9 US attorney offices have largely come to rely on corporate self-policing, stepping in when they feel internal probes are skirting serious issues, such as in the case of Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. (ACS). At ACS, the odds of the chosen dates for option granting were determined to be 300 billion to 1 against being randomly selected.
Backdating options are clearly illegal if not reported to shareholders, causing serious accounting and tax problems for companies and their executives. The SEC, which is leading the federal investigation, has more than 150 lawyers and accountants working on the scandal, despite the number of companies conducting their own internal examinations and turning the results over to federal authorities. The situation in Silicon Valley is so serious that the US Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California formed a special force of prosecutors and FBI agents. According to Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC, "The sheer magnitude of the numbers of companies, executives, and corporate boards that have disclosed options-related investigations in mind-boggling...." Add to that the millions of dollars being spent in the corporate sector by more than 100 companies, and you have a corporate scandal many times larger than anything cooked up by Enron or HP.
The scandal is now so large that the SEC must let the fox watch the hen house, relying on self-reporting of a practice that has become so common in corporate America as to overwhelm federal investigative resources. Clearly some companies will escape prosecution altogether, while many will be let off the hook for their good effort for restating financials and self-correcting internally. The sheer number of companies conducting such internal investigations, to the tune of several million dollars in legal fees, is unprecendented. Yet, it is clearly not enough and raises questions of fairness for those who choose not to conduct internal reviews, instead taking the gamble such practices will not be discovered. Although the SEC now has put in place measures to evaluate the outside investigators, this is a problem now so widespread that nothing like its magnitude has been seen since the 1970s when the overseas bribery scandal rocked the financial pages of newspapers everywhere.
Stock option backdating may not have the audacity of the Enron scandal or the intrigue of the HP debacle, but it has a serious impact on the earnings of many, many US corporations and the ability of the top 1 percent of wage earners to profit at the expense of us all. Isn't that a scandal you should know about?
"...antics of Enron bad boys Andrew Fastow and Jeffrey Skilling, but it's depth and breadth are unsurpassed by anything that happened at Enron or HP."
THIS WAS NOTHING!!
November 28, 2006 by Christine Zibas
"...What is the problem so pervasive that it is overtaking these corporate nosedives? It's stock option backdating, and according to the "Wall Street Journal" in its "scandal scorecard," the number of companies now facing federal investigation is at least 130: the number reporting internal probes: 153; the number of executives or directors resigning or being fired: at least 42, including 10 CEOs; the number criminally charged: 5; and the amount of misstated profits from misdated options: $5.3 billion from more than 60 companies."
"...US Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California formed a special force of prosecutors and FBI agents. According to Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC, "The sheer magnitude of the numbers of companies, executives, and corporate boards that have disclosed options-related investigations in mind-boggling...." Add to that the millions of dollars being spent in the corporate sector by more than 100 companies, and you have a corporate scandal many times larger than anything cooked up by Enron or HP."
Bigger Than Enron? There's a New Corporate Scandal Brewing
Stock Option Backdating Leads to Federal Scrutiny of More Than 130 Companies
Although much recent attention has been given to the spying of former Hewlett-Packard (HP) Chair Patricia Dunn on H-P board members and high tech journalists, a far greater scandal has been brewing that has flown largely under the public's radar. It's not as tawdry as the Hewlett-Packard scandal, and it does not have the cheekiness of the antics of Enron bad boys Andrew Fastow and Jeffrey Skilling, but it's depth and breadth are unsurpassed by anything that happened at Enron or HP. What is the problem so pervasive that it is overtaking these corporate nosedives? It's stock option backdating, and according to the "Wall Street Journal" in its "scandal scorecard," the number of companies now facing federal investigation is at least 130: the number reporting internal probes: 153; the number of executives or directors resigning or being fired: at least 42, including 10 CEOs; the number criminally charged: 5; and the amount of misstated profits from misdated options: $5.3 billion from more than 60 companies. No small potatoes here.
This dirty little secret has been gracing the pages of the "Wall Street Journal" and other business media, but gone largely unnoticed by the general media. Yet this scandal has rocked some of the most successful companies in the American vernacular: Apple, Home Depot, UnitedHealth Group, and a stunning number of Silicon Valley companies, where backdating one's stock options was a "no brainer."
Stock Option Backdating Leads to Federal Scrutiny of More Than 130 Companies
The current investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has become so large that it is now relying on internal investigations by companies to determine just which companies to pursue on federal indictments. What is this scandal all about? In a nutshell, this story centers on the practice of corporate executives improperly affording themselves undeserved wealth through the process of backdating stock options to dates when a company's stock price is low, giving the grant recipient an instant paper profit. Stock options, part of the typical corporate executive's pay pack, allow the executive to buy company stock at a fixed price on a certain, pre-determined date, allowing the executive to profit if the stock rises in value from the date of purchase. How to win at this game? Pick the date with the lowest stock price. How can the executive know that date? Only through backdating, an illegal practice that now has some 70 companies scrambling to restate or reduce their profits because of said illegal practice.
This problem first came to the attention of the federal government more than 3 years ago, when Stephen Cutler, then an enforcement officer at the SEC read an account suggesting that executives has issued options just prior to the release of news so favorable that it caused a significant rise in the company's stock price. Today, the problems are so large that the SEC, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the US Postal Service, and 9 US attorney offices have largely come to rely on corporate self-policing, stepping in when they feel internal probes are skirting serious issues, such as in the case of Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. (ACS). At ACS, the odds of the chosen dates for option granting were determined to be 300 billion to 1 against being randomly selected.
Backdating options are clearly illegal if not reported to shareholders, causing serious accounting and tax problems for companies and their executives. The SEC, which is leading the federal investigation, has more than 150 lawyers and accountants working on the scandal, despite the number of companies conducting their own internal examinations and turning the results over to federal authorities. The situation in Silicon Valley is so serious that the US Attorney's Office for the Northern District of California formed a special force of prosecutors and FBI agents. According to Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC, "The sheer magnitude of the numbers of companies, executives, and corporate boards that have disclosed options-related investigations in mind-boggling...." Add to that the millions of dollars being spent in the corporate sector by more than 100 companies, and you have a corporate scandal many times larger than anything cooked up by Enron or HP.
The scandal is now so large that the SEC must let the fox watch the hen house, relying on self-reporting of a practice that has become so common in corporate America as to overwhelm federal investigative resources. Clearly some companies will escape prosecution altogether, while many will be let off the hook for their good effort for restating financials and self-correcting internally. The sheer number of companies conducting such internal investigations, to the tune of several million dollars in legal fees, is unprecendented. Yet, it is clearly not enough and raises questions of fairness for those who choose not to conduct internal reviews, instead taking the gamble such practices will not be discovered. Although the SEC now has put in place measures to evaluate the outside investigators, this is a problem now so widespread that nothing like its magnitude has been seen since the 1970s when the overseas bribery scandal rocked the financial pages of newspapers everywhere.
Stock option backdating may not have the audacity of the Enron scandal or the intrigue of the HP debacle, but it has a serious impact on the earnings of many, many US corporations and the ability of the top 1 percent of wage earners to profit at the expense of us all. Isn't that a scandal you should know about?
Saturday, February 14, 2009
Morgan Stanley private incarnation
Another PUBLIC goes PRIVATE SCAM....PONZI SCHEME
Morgan Stanley hasn't said yet if Crescent's top executives will stay with its new, private incarnation.
"...despite four shareholder lawsuits in Tarrant County, Texas, contesting it. "
This spring, Crescent said it intended to sell off its non-office holdings. A deal to sell the whole company to Morgan Stanley came up in May.
Financial adviser Richard Rainwater of Fort Worth, who formerly worked with Texas' wealthy Bass brothers, co-founded Crescent in 1994 with CEO John Goff.
Wednesday, August 1, 2007
REIT with extensive Colo. holdings to be soldDenver Business Journal
Shareholders in Crescent Real Estate Equities Co. of Fort Worth, Texas, OK'd the company's sale on Wednesday to Morgan Stanley for roughly $6 billion.
As of mid-July, Crescent owned 2.5 million square feet of office properties in Colorado and several residential developments in downtown Denver and mountain ski towns.
Nearly 74 percent of holders of Crescent's outstanding shares favored the sale.
The transaction includes a $22.80 per-share offering, valued at $2.3 billion, plus the assumption of $3.1 billion in Crescent debt.
The sale is expected to close Aug. 3, despite four shareholder lawsuits in Tarrant County, Texas, contesting it. Publicly traded Crescent (NYSE: CEI) will merge into an affiliate of New York-based Morgan Stanley's (NYSE: MS) real estate group. The existing Crescent company will cease to operate.
Crescent, a real estate investment trust (REIT), currently has 23 million square feet of office space nationwide, as well as residential and resort holdings.
The Texas company sold its 613-room Marriott City Center hotel in downtown Denver -- one of the metro area's largest hotels -- in a package deal in March. Walton TCC Hotel Investors V LLC bought the Marriott and Crescent's 190-room Park Hyatt Beaver Creek Resort for $550 million.
Crescent's current Denver-area office holdings include:
Johns Manville Plaza -- 675,400 square feet at 717 17th St., Denver, one of downtown Denver's largest office buildings;
707 17th Street (also called MCI Tower) -- 550,805 square feet in downtown Denver;
Regency Plaza One -- 309,862 square feet at 4643 S. Ulster St. in the Denver Tech Center;
Peakview Tower -- 264,149 square feet at 6465 S. Greenwood Plaza Blvd. in Centennial;
44 Cook -- 124,174 square feet at 44 Cook St. in Denver;
55 Madison -- 137,176 square feet at 55 Madison St. in Denver;
The Citadel -- 130,652 square feet at 3200 Cherry Creek South Drive in Denver.
Crescent's Denver residential developments that have not yet sold out include One Riverfront and The Park at One Riverfront. The company has another 310 acres in metro Denver for future housing development, including nearly seven acres downtown.
The Fort Worth company's mountain residential holdings range from Eagle Ranch in Eagle to Three Peaks in Silverthorne and Riverfront Village in Beaver Creek. Crescent has 170 acres for future projects.
This spring, Crescent said it intended to sell off its non-office holdings. A deal to sell the whole company to Morgan Stanley came up in May.
Financial adviser Richard Rainwater of Fort Worth, who formerly worked with Texas' wealthy Bass brothers, co-founded Crescent in 1994 with CEO John Goff.
Rainwater currently sits on company boards, and owns or controls more than 4 percent of the company's shares, according to GlobeSt.com. He also has more than 5 million partnership units. Goff and company president Dennis Alberts recently forfeited their $10.3 million worth of partnership units as part of the Morgan Stanley deal.
Morgan Stanley hasn't said yet if Crescent's top executives will stay with its new, private incarnation.
Morgan Stanley hasn't said yet if Crescent's top executives will stay with its new, private incarnation.
"...despite four shareholder lawsuits in Tarrant County, Texas, contesting it. "
This spring, Crescent said it intended to sell off its non-office holdings. A deal to sell the whole company to Morgan Stanley came up in May.
Financial adviser Richard Rainwater of Fort Worth, who formerly worked with Texas' wealthy Bass brothers, co-founded Crescent in 1994 with CEO John Goff.
Wednesday, August 1, 2007
REIT with extensive Colo. holdings to be soldDenver Business Journal
Shareholders in Crescent Real Estate Equities Co. of Fort Worth, Texas, OK'd the company's sale on Wednesday to Morgan Stanley for roughly $6 billion.
As of mid-July, Crescent owned 2.5 million square feet of office properties in Colorado and several residential developments in downtown Denver and mountain ski towns.
Nearly 74 percent of holders of Crescent's outstanding shares favored the sale.
The transaction includes a $22.80 per-share offering, valued at $2.3 billion, plus the assumption of $3.1 billion in Crescent debt.
The sale is expected to close Aug. 3, despite four shareholder lawsuits in Tarrant County, Texas, contesting it. Publicly traded Crescent (NYSE: CEI) will merge into an affiliate of New York-based Morgan Stanley's (NYSE: MS) real estate group. The existing Crescent company will cease to operate.
Crescent, a real estate investment trust (REIT), currently has 23 million square feet of office space nationwide, as well as residential and resort holdings.
The Texas company sold its 613-room Marriott City Center hotel in downtown Denver -- one of the metro area's largest hotels -- in a package deal in March. Walton TCC Hotel Investors V LLC bought the Marriott and Crescent's 190-room Park Hyatt Beaver Creek Resort for $550 million.
Crescent's current Denver-area office holdings include:
Johns Manville Plaza -- 675,400 square feet at 717 17th St., Denver, one of downtown Denver's largest office buildings;
707 17th Street (also called MCI Tower) -- 550,805 square feet in downtown Denver;
Regency Plaza One -- 309,862 square feet at 4643 S. Ulster St. in the Denver Tech Center;
Peakview Tower -- 264,149 square feet at 6465 S. Greenwood Plaza Blvd. in Centennial;
44 Cook -- 124,174 square feet at 44 Cook St. in Denver;
55 Madison -- 137,176 square feet at 55 Madison St. in Denver;
The Citadel -- 130,652 square feet at 3200 Cherry Creek South Drive in Denver.
Crescent's Denver residential developments that have not yet sold out include One Riverfront and The Park at One Riverfront. The company has another 310 acres in metro Denver for future housing development, including nearly seven acres downtown.
The Fort Worth company's mountain residential holdings range from Eagle Ranch in Eagle to Three Peaks in Silverthorne and Riverfront Village in Beaver Creek. Crescent has 170 acres for future projects.
This spring, Crescent said it intended to sell off its non-office holdings. A deal to sell the whole company to Morgan Stanley came up in May.
Financial adviser Richard Rainwater of Fort Worth, who formerly worked with Texas' wealthy Bass brothers, co-founded Crescent in 1994 with CEO John Goff.
Rainwater currently sits on company boards, and owns or controls more than 4 percent of the company's shares, according to GlobeSt.com. He also has more than 5 million partnership units. Goff and company president Dennis Alberts recently forfeited their $10.3 million worth of partnership units as part of the Morgan Stanley deal.
Morgan Stanley hasn't said yet if Crescent's top executives will stay with its new, private incarnation.
Sunday, February 8, 2009
HARRY MARKOPOLOS....look at the publicly traded companies dumping the losing assets into private companies....
THIS NEEDS TO END! WAKE UP AMERICA! MORE PONZI SCHEMES?
JPMorgan and CITI were found GUILTY of contributing to the ENRON PONSI SCHEME. Both JPMORGAN CHASE and CITI PAID GOVERNMENT SETTLED AGREEMENTS FOR FRAUD in our nation's “LARGEST ‘PRIVATE’ FINANACIAL FRAUD CASE “ in our history! National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. (NCFE) Federal prosecutors proclaimed “no one has ever heard of”. I believe that was intentional.
In the trial in Columbus, ALL executives except one, was acquitted. Who was this one and only executive acquitted? James K Happ. Mr. James K Happ was the CFO at Richard Rainwater's Columbia Homecare Group before arriving at National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. NCFE.
BUT HOLD ON......Now, FEBRUARY 2009, even though NCFE case was supposedly CLOSED by the DOJ in the BUSH ADMINISTRAION, in 2008, is now back in the INVESTIGATIN OF :
Credit Suisse Seeks Sanctions against Lloyds
Law360, New York (February 03, 2009) -- Credit Suisse Securities LLC has asked the court overseeing litigation over the collapse of health care lender National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. to sanction Lloyds TSB Bank PLC for allegedly hiding a deal with Moody's Investor Services Inc. in order to manipulate a deposition in its favor.Credit Suisse, which is accused by Lloyds and others of committing fraud as an agent for National Century's note offerings, said in a motion filed Friday that Lloyds concealed an...
JPMorgan and CITI were found GUILTY of contributing to the ENRON PONSI SCHEME. Both JPMORGAN CHASE and CITI PAID GOVERNMENT SETTLED AGREEMENTS FOR FRAUD in our nation's “LARGEST ‘PRIVATE’ FINANACIAL FRAUD CASE “ in our history! National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. (NCFE) Federal prosecutors proclaimed “no one has ever heard of”. I believe that was intentional.
In the trial in Columbus, ALL executives except one, was acquitted. Who was this one and only executive acquitted? James K Happ. Mr. James K Happ was the CFO at Richard Rainwater's Columbia Homecare Group before arriving at National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. NCFE.
BUT HOLD ON......Now, FEBRUARY 2009, even though NCFE case was supposedly CLOSED by the DOJ in the BUSH ADMINISTRAION, in 2008, is now back in the INVESTIGATIN OF :
Credit Suisse Seeks Sanctions against Lloyds
Law360, New York (February 03, 2009) -- Credit Suisse Securities LLC has asked the court overseeing litigation over the collapse of health care lender National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. to sanction Lloyds TSB Bank PLC for allegedly hiding a deal with Moody's Investor Services Inc. in order to manipulate a deposition in its favor.Credit Suisse, which is accused by Lloyds and others of committing fraud as an agent for National Century's note offerings, said in a motion filed Friday that Lloyds concealed an...
WAKE UP AMERICA! Credit Suisse Securities LLC investigates NCFE...
THIS NEEDS TO END! WAKE UP AMERICA! MORE PONZI SCHEMES?
JPMorgan and CITI were found GUILTY of contributing to the ENRON PONSI SCHEME. Both JPMORGAN CHASE and CITI PAID GOVERNMENT SETTLED AGREEMENTS FOR FRAUD in our nation's “LARGEST ‘PRIVATE’ FINANACIAL FRAUD CASE “ in our history! National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. (NCFE) Federal prosecutors proclaimed “no one has ever heard of”. I believe that was intentional.
In the trial in Columbus, ALL executives ECCEPT ONE, was acquitted. Who was this one and only executive acquitted? James K Happ. Mr. James K Happ was the CFO at Richard Rainwater's Columbia Homecare Group before arriving at National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. NCFE.
BUT HOLD ON......Now, FEBRUARY 2009, even though NCFE case was supposedly CLOSED by the DOJ in the BUSH ADMINISTRAION, in 2008, is now back in the INVESTIGATIN OF :
Credit Suisse Seeks Sanctions against Lloyds
Law360, New York (February 03, 2009) -- Credit Suisse Securities LLC has asked the court overseeing litigation over the collapse of health care lender National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. to sanction Lloyds TSB Bank PLC for allegedly hiding a deal with Moody's Investor Services Inc. in order to manipulate a deposition in its favor.Credit Suisse, which is accused by Lloyds and others of committing fraud as an agent for National Century's note offerings, said in a motion filed Friday that Lloyds concealed an...
JPMorgan and CITI were found GUILTY of contributing to the ENRON PONSI SCHEME. Both JPMORGAN CHASE and CITI PAID GOVERNMENT SETTLED AGREEMENTS FOR FRAUD in our nation's “LARGEST ‘PRIVATE’ FINANACIAL FRAUD CASE “ in our history! National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. (NCFE) Federal prosecutors proclaimed “no one has ever heard of”. I believe that was intentional.
In the trial in Columbus, ALL executives ECCEPT ONE, was acquitted. Who was this one and only executive acquitted? James K Happ. Mr. James K Happ was the CFO at Richard Rainwater's Columbia Homecare Group before arriving at National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. NCFE.
BUT HOLD ON......Now, FEBRUARY 2009, even though NCFE case was supposedly CLOSED by the DOJ in the BUSH ADMINISTRAION, in 2008, is now back in the INVESTIGATIN OF :
Credit Suisse Seeks Sanctions against Lloyds
Law360, New York (February 03, 2009) -- Credit Suisse Securities LLC has asked the court overseeing litigation over the collapse of health care lender National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. to sanction Lloyds TSB Bank PLC for allegedly hiding a deal with Moody's Investor Services Inc. in order to manipulate a deposition in its favor.Credit Suisse, which is accused by Lloyds and others of committing fraud as an agent for National Century's note offerings, said in a motion filed Friday that Lloyds concealed an...
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
made loans to inner-city Medicare hospitals....HEALTH and FINANCIAL FRAUD connection
The treasurer has stated on numerous occasions that a Texas law firm helped recover funds from the NCFE case, and has said he is not sure whether Goddard's office is entitled to the full 35 percent.
The state treasury lost $14.3 million to NCFE. So far, the state has recovered about 53 percent of $131 million in losses, Martin said.
An accompanying provision was touted by Martin as a means to ensure independent attorneys could be hired only to handle complex cases such as securities, bankruptcy matters and to offer financial advice.
The fraud, committed in 2002 by National Century Financial Enterprises, cost Arizona governments approximately $131 million. Two-hundred local Arizona governmental entities and many governments in other states invested in NCFE, which made loans to inner-city Medicare hospitals,...
January 27, 2009
Breaking News
Changes coming for bill on state Treasurer’s legal counsel
By Christian Palmer, christian.palmer@azcapitoltimes.com
A bill intended to allow the Office of the State Treasurer to hire his own attorney to handle complex financial cases was held by a House committee on Jan. 27 after its sponsor raised concerns the legislation would have more sweeping effects.The decision to hold H2103 came from Rep. Sam Crump, the chairman of the House Government Committee. Crump also was the prime sponsor of the proposal, which State Treasurer Dean Martin told committee members could cut costs and help end a longstanding "political turf war."
In official capacity, Martin is represented by the Attorney General's Office, but Crump's bill would attach the Treasurer's Office to a list of nine agencies allowed to hire and pay for their own representation.
An accompanying provision was touted by Martin as a means to ensure independent attorneys could be hired only to handle complex cases such as securities, bankruptcy matters and to offer financial advice.
However, House analysts contested Martin's translation of the bill. They said the measure, as written, would allow the state treasurer to secure lawyers separate from the Attorney General's Office for any matters.
David Gass, a legislative liaison for the Attorney General Terry Goddard, told committee members the option to hire outside legal counsel should not be extended to the Treasurer's Office, which conducts business with almost all state agencies on a daily basis.
The frequent interaction - and the prospect of differing opinions on legal matters - can provide the foundation for interagency conflict, he said.
"You create a conflict that's statewide," Gass said.
Yet, Martin said the benefits to the state presented by the law change are apparent. State law dictates the attorney general is entitled to collect a 35-percent fee on recovered funds, an amount Martin regards as outlandish and far more expensive than bills that would be incurred through specialized private-sector attorneys.
Crump said he will amend the bill and give it another try.
"Let's get it right and bring it back," he told members of the committee.
The issue of the treasurer's access to independent counsel stems from a years-long dispute between Goddard and Martin over a legal bill Martin's office was asked to pay in return for money recouped in a national fraud settlement.
The fraud, committed in 2002 by National Century Financial Enterprises, cost Arizona governments approximately $131 million. Two-hundred local Arizona governmental entities and many governments in other states invested in NCFE, which made loans to inner-city Medicare hospitals, before collapsing in 2002 in a fraud scandal involving $3 billion in lost investments.
After the legal battle, then-Chief Deputy Treasurer Blaine Vance refused to transfer payment for the attorney general's legal services without written approval from the state solicitor general. But in June of 2006, the state Treasurer's Office agreed to pay the Attorney General's Office $1.9 million for legal expenses associated with recouping the lost investments.
The payment was not disclosed to the state Board of Investment, which oversees the state's investment portfolio.
The deal came months after agents with Goddard's office seized computers, 15,000 pages of documents and other materials from the Treasurer's Office as part of an investigation into allegations that Petersen had committed several felonies by using his office to promote character-building teaching materials sold by Character First.
Initially, Petersen faced charges of theft, fraud and conflict of interest. But weeks after resigning in October 2006, he pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor count for failing to disclose a $4,200 commission he received for selling Character First products.
Martin, as a candidate running for treasurer in 2006, cast suspicions on the payment and criticized Petersen's sentence, which included three years of probation, as a "slap on the wrist."
Goddard has defended the payment repeatedly; pointing out that state law authorizes the Attorney General's Office to receive 35 percent of all state funds it recovers.
Upon taking office, Martin stopped issuing Goddard's office a portion of the fraud settlement, which was being distributed to the state periodically, and asked Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas and Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio to investigate the payment.
Martin has asked for separate legal counsel to review the deal and to conclude how much the Attorney General's Office should be paid. The treasurer has stated on numerous occasions that a Texas law firm helped recover funds from the NCFE case, and has said he is not sure whether Goddard's office is entitled to the full 35 percent.
The state treasury lost $14.3 million to NCFE. So far, the state has recovered about 53 percent of $131 million in losses, Martin said.
The state treasury lost $14.3 million to NCFE. So far, the state has recovered about 53 percent of $131 million in losses, Martin said.
An accompanying provision was touted by Martin as a means to ensure independent attorneys could be hired only to handle complex cases such as securities, bankruptcy matters and to offer financial advice.
The fraud, committed in 2002 by National Century Financial Enterprises, cost Arizona governments approximately $131 million. Two-hundred local Arizona governmental entities and many governments in other states invested in NCFE, which made loans to inner-city Medicare hospitals,...
January 27, 2009
Breaking News
Changes coming for bill on state Treasurer’s legal counsel
By Christian Palmer, christian.palmer@azcapitoltimes.com
A bill intended to allow the Office of the State Treasurer to hire his own attorney to handle complex financial cases was held by a House committee on Jan. 27 after its sponsor raised concerns the legislation would have more sweeping effects.The decision to hold H2103 came from Rep. Sam Crump, the chairman of the House Government Committee. Crump also was the prime sponsor of the proposal, which State Treasurer Dean Martin told committee members could cut costs and help end a longstanding "political turf war."
In official capacity, Martin is represented by the Attorney General's Office, but Crump's bill would attach the Treasurer's Office to a list of nine agencies allowed to hire and pay for their own representation.
An accompanying provision was touted by Martin as a means to ensure independent attorneys could be hired only to handle complex cases such as securities, bankruptcy matters and to offer financial advice.
However, House analysts contested Martin's translation of the bill. They said the measure, as written, would allow the state treasurer to secure lawyers separate from the Attorney General's Office for any matters.
David Gass, a legislative liaison for the Attorney General Terry Goddard, told committee members the option to hire outside legal counsel should not be extended to the Treasurer's Office, which conducts business with almost all state agencies on a daily basis.
The frequent interaction - and the prospect of differing opinions on legal matters - can provide the foundation for interagency conflict, he said.
"You create a conflict that's statewide," Gass said.
Yet, Martin said the benefits to the state presented by the law change are apparent. State law dictates the attorney general is entitled to collect a 35-percent fee on recovered funds, an amount Martin regards as outlandish and far more expensive than bills that would be incurred through specialized private-sector attorneys.
Crump said he will amend the bill and give it another try.
"Let's get it right and bring it back," he told members of the committee.
The issue of the treasurer's access to independent counsel stems from a years-long dispute between Goddard and Martin over a legal bill Martin's office was asked to pay in return for money recouped in a national fraud settlement.
The fraud, committed in 2002 by National Century Financial Enterprises, cost Arizona governments approximately $131 million. Two-hundred local Arizona governmental entities and many governments in other states invested in NCFE, which made loans to inner-city Medicare hospitals, before collapsing in 2002 in a fraud scandal involving $3 billion in lost investments.
After the legal battle, then-Chief Deputy Treasurer Blaine Vance refused to transfer payment for the attorney general's legal services without written approval from the state solicitor general. But in June of 2006, the state Treasurer's Office agreed to pay the Attorney General's Office $1.9 million for legal expenses associated with recouping the lost investments.
The payment was not disclosed to the state Board of Investment, which oversees the state's investment portfolio.
The deal came months after agents with Goddard's office seized computers, 15,000 pages of documents and other materials from the Treasurer's Office as part of an investigation into allegations that Petersen had committed several felonies by using his office to promote character-building teaching materials sold by Character First.
Initially, Petersen faced charges of theft, fraud and conflict of interest. But weeks after resigning in October 2006, he pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor count for failing to disclose a $4,200 commission he received for selling Character First products.
Martin, as a candidate running for treasurer in 2006, cast suspicions on the payment and criticized Petersen's sentence, which included three years of probation, as a "slap on the wrist."
Goddard has defended the payment repeatedly; pointing out that state law authorizes the Attorney General's Office to receive 35 percent of all state funds it recovers.
Upon taking office, Martin stopped issuing Goddard's office a portion of the fraud settlement, which was being distributed to the state periodically, and asked Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas and Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio to investigate the payment.
Martin has asked for separate legal counsel to review the deal and to conclude how much the Attorney General's Office should be paid. The treasurer has stated on numerous occasions that a Texas law firm helped recover funds from the NCFE case, and has said he is not sure whether Goddard's office is entitled to the full 35 percent.
The state treasury lost $14.3 million to NCFE. So far, the state has recovered about 53 percent of $131 million in losses, Martin said.
Thursday, January 8, 2009
Six years and four criminal trials ...only the HAPP trial was missing computer files and he was acquitted
“This was the most document-intensive case this office has ever undertaken.”
except for the missing COMPUTER FILES .....
Funny , that is what James K Happ, the only executive to be acquitted, was in charge of divestiture at at Columbia Homecare Group prior to arriving at NCFE...
Friday, December 26, 2008
Newsmakers
National Century saga closes with 10 convictions
Business First of Columbus - by Kevin Kemper
Six years and four criminal trials after a Central Ohio company’s $2.8 billion collapse, the resulting legal saga wrapped up in 2008 with seven former executives convicted – including one who remains on the run – and one who was acquitted on charges stemming from the scam.
The collapse of Dublin-based National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. kept courtrooms inside the Joseph P. Kinneary U.S. District Courthouse in Columbus busy for most of the year with criminal trials and hearings involving former executives and their associates.
Once the largest health-care financing company in the nation, National Century fell into bankruptcy in 2002 after what the government alleged was a massive fraud unraveled. In the six years since, 10 of 11 executives the government targeted for prosecution either pleaded guilty or were convicted on criminal charges for their actions.
“This case set a standard for prosecuting white-collar criminal cases,” said Fred Alverson, spokesman for the U.S. Attorney’s office in Columbus. “This was the most document-intensive case this office has ever undertaken.”
except for the missing COMPUTER FILES .....
Funny , that is what James K Happ, the only executive to be acquitted, was in charge of divestiture at at Columbia Homecare Group prior to arriving at NCFE...
Friday, December 26, 2008
Newsmakers
National Century saga closes with 10 convictions
Business First of Columbus - by Kevin Kemper
Six years and four criminal trials after a Central Ohio company’s $2.8 billion collapse, the resulting legal saga wrapped up in 2008 with seven former executives convicted – including one who remains on the run – and one who was acquitted on charges stemming from the scam.
The collapse of Dublin-based National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. kept courtrooms inside the Joseph P. Kinneary U.S. District Courthouse in Columbus busy for most of the year with criminal trials and hearings involving former executives and their associates.
Once the largest health-care financing company in the nation, National Century fell into bankruptcy in 2002 after what the government alleged was a massive fraud unraveled. In the six years since, 10 of 11 executives the government targeted for prosecution either pleaded guilty or were convicted on criminal charges for their actions.
“This case set a standard for prosecuting white-collar criminal cases,” said Fred Alverson, spokesman for the U.S. Attorney’s office in Columbus. “This was the most document-intensive case this office has ever undertaken.”
Wednesday, January 7, 2009
$5.89 MILLION IN CIVIL FRAUD SETTLEMENTS...home healthcare agency
MEDIA RELEASE
Attention: News Director U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
For Immediate Release DAVID L. HUBER
March 23, 2007 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Western District of Kentucky
Contact: Sandy Focken
(502) 582-5911
******************************************************************************
FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASE RESULT IN
$5.89 MILLION IN CIVIL FRAUD SETTLEMENTS
- Former owner of Louisville, Kentucky, based home healthcare agency, and his wife, both
now residing in Dallas, Texas, pay $2.3 million
- Medshares Diversified, Inc., a former Memphis, Tennessee, home healthcare agency, pays
$2,242,470
- National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. pays $1.35 million.
*** *** ***
David L. Huber, United States Attorney for the Western District of Kentucky, along with the
Department of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Frauds Division, and the Office of the
Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services, announces that after a multiyear
investigation, the United States has reached civil fraud settlements totaling over $5.89 million
with several defendants for their role in alleged violations of the federal False Claims Act. In
particular, William Riddle and Robin Riddle, both of Dallas, Texas, have paid the United States
$2.3 million to settle certain civil fraud claims; Medshares Diversified, Inc., a former Memphis,
Tennessee, home healthcare agency, through its bankruptcy proceedings, paid $2,242,470; and
National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., through its bankruptcy proceedings, recently paid
$1.35 million..
Background
In May, 1999, 86 former employees of a Louisville based home healthcare entity known as
Homecare and Hospital Management, Inc. (“HHM”), filed a federal whistle blower lawsuit in
Louisville, Kentucky. United States ex rel. Employees of HHM 1-86 v. Homecare and Hospital
Management, Inc., William Riddle, Jr., National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., et al., Civil
Action No. 3:99CV-340-H (W.D. Ky). The complaint asserted a barrage of claims, including
violations of the federal False Claims Act. The complaint levied these claims against numerous
defendants, including William Riddle, the former CEO of HHM, and Lance Poulsen, the former
CEO of National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. (“NCFE”). Mr. Poulsen has since been
indicted for his involvement in an alleged multi-billion dollar criminal fraud case being prosecuted
by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Ohio.
HHM was a national home health agency headquartered in Prospect, Kentucky between 1993
through 1998. From its inception, HHM’s business plan was focused on growth accomplished
through the aggressive acquisition of existing home health care businesses. Between fiscal year
(“FY”)1993 and FY 1996 HHM purchased 24 health care businesses, increasing its revenue from
$23.7 million in FY 1994 to $166.8 million in FY 1996. To finance these acquisitions, HHM
utilized NCFE proceeds to supply the funds needed to purchase these agencies. HHM, in turn,
passed through to Medicare all of the financing costs associated with these NCFE funds, thereby
having the Medicare program “underwrite” HHM’s acquisition schedule. It did so by claiming that
these financing costs were reasonably related to patient care and, therefore, reimbursable by
Medicare. In fact, costs associated with these acquisitions were not reimbursable, and their
submission to Medicare for reimbursement was fraudulent.
NCFE was HHM’s primary lender. NCFE’s method of providing funding to HHM was
through a mechanism known as accounts receivable financing. Through this process, HHM would
pledge essentially all of its Medicare receivables to receive advance funding from NCFE. Accounts
receivable financing essentially permitted HHM to immediately gain access to funds using HHM’s
receivables as collateral, thereby permitting HHM to have immediate use of its receivables before
they were actually paid by Medicare.
By 1998, HHM was in dire financial straits, and sold many of its subsidiaries to Medshares.
Nevertheless, in August 1998, HHM was forced into bankruptcy. Many employees were not paid
certain employee benefits, such as paid days off, bonuses, or final paychecks. Mr. Riddle was
named as a defendant in several lawsuits initiated by former employees as well as NCFE (which was
owed millions of dollars from HHM).
Investigation
As part of its investigation, the United States developed certain facts indicating that William
Riddle and Lance Poulsen conspired to defraud the Medicare system by using Medicare to finance
HHM’s growth without the need for investors to pay for HHM’s acquisitions. Funding by NCFE
was timed by William Riddle and Lance Poulsen to create the illusion that NCFE was offering
financing for patient care when, in fact, financing was being used to buy new HHM subsidiaries.
Forensic accounting demonstrated that HHM then passed through its financing costs associated with
NCFE funds used to purchase these subsidiaries to Medicare for reimbursement, despite the fact that
these funds were not used for patient care. The United States estimated that Medicare paid HHM
$2,837,628.00 as a result of this fraudulent conduct.
Medshares, for its part, was investigated by the United States for (1) submitting false claims
to the United States in the form of fraudulent cost reports; (2) submitting for Medicare
reimbursement expenses related to patient care which were not qualified expenses related to actual
patient care; and, (3) engaging in practices that included improperly charging Medicare for NCFE
fees, improperly allocating amounts between HHM’s corporate and regional costs, seeking
reimbursement for “ghost employees” and improperly charging management fees to the Medicare
program. In 1999 Medshares filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of
Tennessee, case number 99-29024-L.
William Riddle subsequently moved to Dallas, Texas with his new wife, Robin Riddle, and
entered into a marital partition agreement that effectively severed any rights William Riddle would
have to certain community property realized by his marriage to Robin Riddle. The United States
alleged that this marital partition agreement was a sham, entered into by the Riddles to shield their
assets from William Riddle’s liability as a result of HHM’s debacle.
Settlements
In March, 2006, William Riddle and Robin Riddle, denying all liability, entered into a
settlement with the United States, agreeing to pay $2.3 million. In July 2006, NCFE agreed to settle
the United States’ claims against it for $1.35 million, as directed through its bankruptcy proceedings.
In July 2003, Medshares entered into a consent judgment with the United States settling its liability
for $2,807,924. The net amount realized from this bankruptcy settlement was $2,242,470. The
federal whistle blowers will receive 15% of the total settlement amounts received by the United
States in accordance with their rights under the federal False Claims Act.
This case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys William F. Campbell and
Benjamin S. Schecter, and Vanessa Reed, Trial Attorney, with the Department of Justice
Commercial Litigation Branch Civil Frauds Division, with assistance from the Office of the
Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services.
- END
Attention: News Director U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
For Immediate Release DAVID L. HUBER
March 23, 2007 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
Western District of Kentucky
Contact: Sandy Focken
(502) 582-5911
******************************************************************************
FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASE RESULT IN
$5.89 MILLION IN CIVIL FRAUD SETTLEMENTS
- Former owner of Louisville, Kentucky, based home healthcare agency, and his wife, both
now residing in Dallas, Texas, pay $2.3 million
- Medshares Diversified, Inc., a former Memphis, Tennessee, home healthcare agency, pays
$2,242,470
- National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. pays $1.35 million.
*** *** ***
David L. Huber, United States Attorney for the Western District of Kentucky, along with the
Department of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Frauds Division, and the Office of the
Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services, announces that after a multiyear
investigation, the United States has reached civil fraud settlements totaling over $5.89 million
with several defendants for their role in alleged violations of the federal False Claims Act. In
particular, William Riddle and Robin Riddle, both of Dallas, Texas, have paid the United States
$2.3 million to settle certain civil fraud claims; Medshares Diversified, Inc., a former Memphis,
Tennessee, home healthcare agency, through its bankruptcy proceedings, paid $2,242,470; and
National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., through its bankruptcy proceedings, recently paid
$1.35 million..
Background
In May, 1999, 86 former employees of a Louisville based home healthcare entity known as
Homecare and Hospital Management, Inc. (“HHM”), filed a federal whistle blower lawsuit in
Louisville, Kentucky. United States ex rel. Employees of HHM 1-86 v. Homecare and Hospital
Management, Inc., William Riddle, Jr., National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., et al., Civil
Action No. 3:99CV-340-H (W.D. Ky). The complaint asserted a barrage of claims, including
violations of the federal False Claims Act. The complaint levied these claims against numerous
defendants, including William Riddle, the former CEO of HHM, and Lance Poulsen, the former
CEO of National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. (“NCFE”). Mr. Poulsen has since been
indicted for his involvement in an alleged multi-billion dollar criminal fraud case being prosecuted
by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Ohio.
HHM was a national home health agency headquartered in Prospect, Kentucky between 1993
through 1998. From its inception, HHM’s business plan was focused on growth accomplished
through the aggressive acquisition of existing home health care businesses. Between fiscal year
(“FY”)1993 and FY 1996 HHM purchased 24 health care businesses, increasing its revenue from
$23.7 million in FY 1994 to $166.8 million in FY 1996. To finance these acquisitions, HHM
utilized NCFE proceeds to supply the funds needed to purchase these agencies. HHM, in turn,
passed through to Medicare all of the financing costs associated with these NCFE funds, thereby
having the Medicare program “underwrite” HHM’s acquisition schedule. It did so by claiming that
these financing costs were reasonably related to patient care and, therefore, reimbursable by
Medicare. In fact, costs associated with these acquisitions were not reimbursable, and their
submission to Medicare for reimbursement was fraudulent.
NCFE was HHM’s primary lender. NCFE’s method of providing funding to HHM was
through a mechanism known as accounts receivable financing. Through this process, HHM would
pledge essentially all of its Medicare receivables to receive advance funding from NCFE. Accounts
receivable financing essentially permitted HHM to immediately gain access to funds using HHM’s
receivables as collateral, thereby permitting HHM to have immediate use of its receivables before
they were actually paid by Medicare.
By 1998, HHM was in dire financial straits, and sold many of its subsidiaries to Medshares.
Nevertheless, in August 1998, HHM was forced into bankruptcy. Many employees were not paid
certain employee benefits, such as paid days off, bonuses, or final paychecks. Mr. Riddle was
named as a defendant in several lawsuits initiated by former employees as well as NCFE (which was
owed millions of dollars from HHM).
Investigation
As part of its investigation, the United States developed certain facts indicating that William
Riddle and Lance Poulsen conspired to defraud the Medicare system by using Medicare to finance
HHM’s growth without the need for investors to pay for HHM’s acquisitions. Funding by NCFE
was timed by William Riddle and Lance Poulsen to create the illusion that NCFE was offering
financing for patient care when, in fact, financing was being used to buy new HHM subsidiaries.
Forensic accounting demonstrated that HHM then passed through its financing costs associated with
NCFE funds used to purchase these subsidiaries to Medicare for reimbursement, despite the fact that
these funds were not used for patient care. The United States estimated that Medicare paid HHM
$2,837,628.00 as a result of this fraudulent conduct.
Medshares, for its part, was investigated by the United States for (1) submitting false claims
to the United States in the form of fraudulent cost reports; (2) submitting for Medicare
reimbursement expenses related to patient care which were not qualified expenses related to actual
patient care; and, (3) engaging in practices that included improperly charging Medicare for NCFE
fees, improperly allocating amounts between HHM’s corporate and regional costs, seeking
reimbursement for “ghost employees” and improperly charging management fees to the Medicare
program. In 1999 Medshares filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the Western District of
Tennessee, case number 99-29024-L.
William Riddle subsequently moved to Dallas, Texas with his new wife, Robin Riddle, and
entered into a marital partition agreement that effectively severed any rights William Riddle would
have to certain community property realized by his marriage to Robin Riddle. The United States
alleged that this marital partition agreement was a sham, entered into by the Riddles to shield their
assets from William Riddle’s liability as a result of HHM’s debacle.
Settlements
In March, 2006, William Riddle and Robin Riddle, denying all liability, entered into a
settlement with the United States, agreeing to pay $2.3 million. In July 2006, NCFE agreed to settle
the United States’ claims against it for $1.35 million, as directed through its bankruptcy proceedings.
In July 2003, Medshares entered into a consent judgment with the United States settling its liability
for $2,807,924. The net amount realized from this bankruptcy settlement was $2,242,470. The
federal whistle blowers will receive 15% of the total settlement amounts received by the United
States in accordance with their rights under the federal False Claims Act.
This case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys William F. Campbell and
Benjamin S. Schecter, and Vanessa Reed, Trial Attorney, with the Department of Justice
Commercial Litigation Branch Civil Frauds Division, with assistance from the Office of the
Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services.
- END
Important information on a National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. computer system was either lost or tampered with
Wednesday, March 5, 2008
IT expert: National Century computer system unreliable
Business First of Columbus - by Kevin Kemper Business First
Important information on a National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. computer system was either lost or tampered with, a computer expert testified for the defense, however the government did its best to call the witness's testimony into question.
Jon Bryant, an information technology computer consultant that used to work at National Century, told jury members on Tuesday and Wednesday that the AS/400 mainframe computer used by National Century to track accounts receivable was missing information after a crash that left nine of its hard drives inoperable.
The crash occurred, Bryant said, sometime after he stopped working for National Century in 2001, possibly when the government gained control of the system during its investigation.
Defense attorneys hired Bryant as an expert witness in 2007 to conduct an analysis of the information contained on National Century's AS/400 system. When Bryant conducted his analysis, he found that there was $300 million in accounts receivable missing from the system due to the crash.
The government has used information from the AS/400 to allege to the jury that millions of dollars went missing from the National Century's accounts.
Dublin-based National Century was a financier of last resort for health-care providers. The firm specialized in buying receivables from medical businesses at a discount, giving them cash up front so they could pay their bills. It then packaged the receivables as asset-backed bonds and sold them to investors.
Five of the company's former executives - Rebecca Parrett, Donald Ayers, Roger Faulkenberry, Randolph Speer and James Dierker - are facing charges of fraud, conspiracy and money laundering for their alleged involvement in National Century's nearly $3 billion collapse and bankruptcy in 2002.
They have all pleaded not guilty to the charges.
When the government got its chance to cross-examine Bryant, Assistant U.S. Attorney Douglas Squires did his best to call Bryant's word into question.
Squires first attempted to show that Bryant was not an information technology expert.
Squires asked Bryant about memos that circulated among National Century executives that suggested computer programs Bryant wrote did not work properly.
Bryant said he was not familiar with those memos.
Squires then asked Bryant about his relationship with Parrett. When Bryant admitted the two are friends, Squires suggested Bryant might lie for her. Bryant said he would not.
Squires also asked Bryant about statements Bryant made to the FBI in 2002. Bryant admitted he told the FBI that the company tried to deceive auditors and that funds were moved among accounts to hide shortfalls.
Squires also suggested that Bryant was disgruntled when he worked for National Century and that he volunteered to be a government witness in the case.
Bryant said neither was true.
Defense attorneys called their third witness after Bryant, a securitizations expert named Gregory Gac.
Gac, owner of Shorewood, Minn.-based Quadrant Financial Group LLC, was hired by the defense at a rate of $450 an hour to analyze the documents that governed National Century's bond funds.
The government has alleged that because the defendants allowed reserve funds for National Century bonds to be depleted, they had committed securities fraud. But Gac said National Century's bond reserve funds were allowed to fluctuate.
Under cross-examination, he admitted that he had sat in on earlier testimony in the trial when the government's star witness said she was behind a massive and ongoing fraud at the company. Gac said he found her testimony, "appalling," and that her behavior gives everyone in the finance industry a black eye.
The defense also called two character witnesses on behalf of Dierker, in advance of his expected testimony on Thursday. Barry Salmons, a friend and vice president of marketing at Huntington National Bank, testified that Dierker was a man of character, integrity and honesty. Susan Horn, a former executive vice president of marketing at Victoria's Secret, said that when Dierker worked for her, he was an outstanding employee with great morals and if she heard him testify she would believe what he said.
IT expert: National Century computer system unreliable
Business First of Columbus - by Kevin Kemper Business First
Important information on a National Century Financial Enterprises Inc. computer system was either lost or tampered with, a computer expert testified for the defense, however the government did its best to call the witness's testimony into question.
Jon Bryant, an information technology computer consultant that used to work at National Century, told jury members on Tuesday and Wednesday that the AS/400 mainframe computer used by National Century to track accounts receivable was missing information after a crash that left nine of its hard drives inoperable.
The crash occurred, Bryant said, sometime after he stopped working for National Century in 2001, possibly when the government gained control of the system during its investigation.
Defense attorneys hired Bryant as an expert witness in 2007 to conduct an analysis of the information contained on National Century's AS/400 system. When Bryant conducted his analysis, he found that there was $300 million in accounts receivable missing from the system due to the crash.
The government has used information from the AS/400 to allege to the jury that millions of dollars went missing from the National Century's accounts.
Dublin-based National Century was a financier of last resort for health-care providers. The firm specialized in buying receivables from medical businesses at a discount, giving them cash up front so they could pay their bills. It then packaged the receivables as asset-backed bonds and sold them to investors.
Five of the company's former executives - Rebecca Parrett, Donald Ayers, Roger Faulkenberry, Randolph Speer and James Dierker - are facing charges of fraud, conspiracy and money laundering for their alleged involvement in National Century's nearly $3 billion collapse and bankruptcy in 2002.
They have all pleaded not guilty to the charges.
When the government got its chance to cross-examine Bryant, Assistant U.S. Attorney Douglas Squires did his best to call Bryant's word into question.
Squires first attempted to show that Bryant was not an information technology expert.
Squires asked Bryant about memos that circulated among National Century executives that suggested computer programs Bryant wrote did not work properly.
Bryant said he was not familiar with those memos.
Squires then asked Bryant about his relationship with Parrett. When Bryant admitted the two are friends, Squires suggested Bryant might lie for her. Bryant said he would not.
Squires also asked Bryant about statements Bryant made to the FBI in 2002. Bryant admitted he told the FBI that the company tried to deceive auditors and that funds were moved among accounts to hide shortfalls.
Squires also suggested that Bryant was disgruntled when he worked for National Century and that he volunteered to be a government witness in the case.
Bryant said neither was true.
Defense attorneys called their third witness after Bryant, a securitizations expert named Gregory Gac.
Gac, owner of Shorewood, Minn.-based Quadrant Financial Group LLC, was hired by the defense at a rate of $450 an hour to analyze the documents that governed National Century's bond funds.
The government has alleged that because the defendants allowed reserve funds for National Century bonds to be depleted, they had committed securities fraud. But Gac said National Century's bond reserve funds were allowed to fluctuate.
Under cross-examination, he admitted that he had sat in on earlier testimony in the trial when the government's star witness said she was behind a massive and ongoing fraud at the company. Gac said he found her testimony, "appalling," and that her behavior gives everyone in the finance industry a black eye.
The defense also called two character witnesses on behalf of Dierker, in advance of his expected testimony on Thursday. Barry Salmons, a friend and vice president of marketing at Huntington National Bank, testified that Dierker was a man of character, integrity and honesty. Susan Horn, a former executive vice president of marketing at Victoria's Secret, said that when Dierker worked for her, he was an outstanding employee with great morals and if she heard him testify she would believe what he said.
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